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1  ALFRED BEARDSLEY, REPORT OF THE BEARDSLEY DIVORCE CASE (1860). 
2  Until 1967, the only ground for divorce in New York was adultery.  RODERICK PHILLIPS,
PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 568-569 (1988).
2
Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in
Nineteenth Century Divorce Law
Naomi Cahn*
INTRODUCTION
For six days in November of 1860, Judge Lott of the Brooklyn Supreme Court heard the
divorce case brought by Alfred Beardsley against Mary Elizabeth Beardsley.1  Mr. Beardsley claimed
that his wife had committed bigamy2 by marrying another man while she was still married to him.  Mr.
Beardsley produced the testimony of Father Malone, the Catholic priest who had performed this
presumptive second marriage, as well as Thomas Mahon, the alleged second husband. The putative
second husband told of how he had courted and wed Mrs. Beardsley, believing her, at the time, to be
Miss Emma Evaline Seymore; Miss Seymore had represented not only that she was the daughter of a
3  BEARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 14.
4  Id. at 16.
5  BEARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 76.
6  BEARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 38.
7  Id. at 66.  For a perceptive analysis of the Beardsley case that arrives at somewhat different
conclusions, see NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY
GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 168-172 (1999). 
8  BEARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 14.
9  While the concept of a conspiracy against one’s client was an oft-repeated charge, there is
tantalizing support for the accusations that Mr. Beardsley had manufactured the charges against his
wife.  In the earlier report of another trial, a witness testified that an adulterous husband “wanted to hire
a man to marry his wife so that he could marry” another woman. MORTIMER J. SMITH, TRIAL OF
MORTIMER J. SMITH ON AN INDICTMENT FOR LIBEL ON MISS EMMA WILLIAMS 3 (1847).
3
Canadian admiral, but also that she was an heiress.3  Dr. Mahon, although initially somewhat reluctant
to answer, ultimately testified that the marriage had been “consummated more than once.”4     In
closing, Mr. Beardsley’s counsel charged: “I have no fears as to your verdict . . . It must be guilty
against this faithless wife, this wicked woman, this unnatural mother, this impudent bawd!”5
The accusations against Mrs. Beardsley were, in the words of her counsel, “strange.”6 
Chauncy Shaffer, Mrs. Beardsley’s counsel, argued that her husband was profaning her feminine
character unjustly.7  On cross-examination, Mr. Shaffer elicited the priest’s testimony that the woman
whose marriage he had performed “was veiled and wore a dark dress; she raised her veil only once or
twice . . . [he did not] remember the color of her eyes or hair.”8  Further, Mr. Shaffer alleged, Mrs.
Beardsley was the victim of a conspiracy masterminded by her husband which framed her for bigamy. 9 
 In a final attack on character and credibility, Mr. Shaffer argued that Mr. Beardsley was unclean in that
10 The Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1865, at 2.
11   See id; THE DIARY OF GEORGE TEMPLETON STRONG: POST-WAR YEARS 1865-1875 54,
58 (Allan Nevins & Milton Halsey Thomas eds. 1952).  
12  The Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1865, at 1.
Mrs. Strong allegedly did not know whether this child was biologically her husband’s – or his
brother’s.  The Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 1, 1865, at  4.
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he had committed adultery and visited houses of “ill-fame,” and that he was dependent on the financial
largesse of his wife’s family.
*  * * * * *
On November 23, 1865, the divorce trial of Peter Strong against Mary Strong opened in New
York City before Judge Garvin of the Superior Court.  The NEW YORK TIMES described the trial, on
page 2, announcing that “No case before our courts for many years has attracted greater attention.”10 
For the next five weeks, the trial was extensively covered by the media; both of the major New York
newspapers provided daily accounts of the testimony and arguments.11  Peter Strong was a prominent
lawyer, and the nephew of the noted diarist George Templeton Strong, and his wife, Mary Stevens
Strong, was the daughter of an influential businessman, the President of the Bank of Commerce.  Since
this was New York, the ground for divorce was adultery. 
Mr. Strong accused his wife of committing adultery with his brother, Edward Strong.  She
counter-sued, claiming that he had committed adultery as well, including with the woman who had
helped him procure an abortion for his wife.12  Mrs. Strong also alleged that her husband, a lawyer, had
13  STRONG, supra note __, at 58.  Mrs. Strong’s counsel noted that “When a lawyer does not
expend his smartness upon the world, but goes to his own fireside, or to that of some family into which
he has married . . . he is a thorn in the side of their happiness.”  Id. at 32.
14  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1875, at 1.
15  Id.
16  N.Y. TIMES Dec. 27, 1865, at 2.
17  There were various allegations of jury tampering.  See Diary, supra note __, at 59;
Charges of Bribery–A Card From the Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1866, at 8. 
18  See e.g., JUDITH WALLERSTEIN, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE (2000).
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never provided an “independent home” for her.13   Her counsel argued that she suffered from his
bringing an action for divorce as a “loving mother,”14 and that she was, as a wife, “absolutely in the
power of her husband, who of course was supreme above her.”15  She was religious, pious, and
sober.16  Ultimately, the trial resulted in a hung jury, with 10 jurors seeming to believe Mr. Strong that
his wife was the adulterer, and two of them believing Mrs. Strong that her husband had committed
adultery.17
* * * * * * 
To a culture raised on no-fault divorce, all of the stories told in these trials appear strange.
These two divorce cases, one just prior to the Civil War, and one just after the Civil War, are very
distant from our contemporary focus on divorce where, because of the ease with which divorce is
granted, the contentious issues concern child custody, alimony, and property distribution,18 not fault.
Instead, this Article argues that the textured history of divorce law in the United States shows
19  If the woman brought the suit seeking a divorce, then she might receive alimony and custody
and be permitted to marry again.  For example, in the 1847 divorce case of Mary W. Groesbeck vs.
David Groesbeck, the court ordered alimony and child support to the innocent wife; in addition, she
was free to marry again, while her husband was not. TRIAL OF MORTIMER J. SMITH ON AN
INDICTMENT FOR LIBEL ON MISS EMMA WILLIAMS 39-39 (1847).  And, if the husband initiated the
divorce action, but the wife could prove her innocence, then there would be no finding of fault and,
consequently, no divorce. 
20  See Margaret F. Brinig and Steve Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 869 (1994)(prior to the 1960s, marriage encouraged gendered investments with clear and
enforceable norms); Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and
Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 508 (contrasting the situation of a wife in the fault and no-
fault eras). 
21  See Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work:
Gender as Tradition,  __ CHI.-KENT L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2001)(manuscript on file with author).
22  See Margaret F. Brinig and Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots are Made for Walking”:
Why Most Divorce Filers are Women, 2 AM . L. & ECON. REV. 126, 143, 145 (2000)(older women
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how the law has affected gendered marital roles through its regulation of divorce.  While fault is no
longer the focus of divorce, conformity with gendered expectations remains a central aspect of the
marital dissolution legal process.  In the nineteenth century, conformity benefitted women; if they were
the innocent spouse who had taken care of the children, the household, and their husbands, then they
were protected against divorce.19  Nineteenth century ideology strongly supported this gendered role of
both women and wives, and there was virtually a complete overlap between gendered and marital
roles.   
By the late twentieth century, those very same actions of gender conformity had very different
consequences.20   In the nineteenth century, a woman’s highest calling was to act as a wife; this is no
longer true.21  Late twentieth century wives who try to live the same lives as their nineteenth century
counterparts are penalized.22  While gender roles and expectations, together with domestic relations
in long-term marriages are less likely to file for divorce than their husbands because of their investments
in the marriage and the costs of their foregone careers).
23  The concept of social norms is highly complex, and has recently become a standard even
within the law and economics literature.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LA W :
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens:
An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA . L. REV. 1577; Eric A. Posner, Family Law
and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT  256 (F.H. Buckley ed. 1999);
see also Lawrence Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177 (1999); Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA . L. REV. 1603 (2000). 
I am using norms here simply to mean culturally expected behaviours, however those expectations are
created and maintained. See Steven Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA . L. REV. 1971,
1973 (2000)(a norm is a “cluster of expectations about what is appropriate in a given situation”);
Scott, supra, at 1638 (the meaning and applicability of norms varies depending on the circumstances,
and more than one norm is generally relevant in any situation).  Social norms and legal norms (law) may
diverge or converge.
24  See Lawrence Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-
Fault, 86 VA . L. REV. 1497, 1534 (2000)(noting that no-fault divorce seems to find gender inequality
irrelevant).
25  For some of the dangers, see Friedman, supra note __; Herman Hill Kay, From the Second
Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States
During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2081-2082 (2000); Jana Singer, DIVORCE
REFORM AND GENDER JUSTICE, 67 N.C.L. REV. 1103, 1105-1112 (1989).
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laws, are changing, the realities of most women’s lives do not yet accord with these changes.   Instead,
the social norms23 for marital roles diverge from the leal norms embodied by divorce law.24  Examining
nineteenth century divorce illustrates the confining nature of these congruent legal and social norms, but
also illustrates how contemporary divorce law has become separated from these norms.  I do not
believe that divorce law should return to fault25 or to reinforcing confining gender roles; I support men’s
and women’s abilities to play different roles within marriage, and I believe that divorce law should
respect these diverse and changing roles.  This examination of nineteenth century divorce shows the
relationship between gender roles and domestic relations law, but also shows how social norms and
26   Professor Reva Siegel suggests that, in the years following the civil war, “legislatures were
expanding the statutory grounds for divorce, and judges charged with applying these statutory norms
interpreted them ever more liberally.”   Reva Siegel,  “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2133 (1996).  
In expanding the statutory bases for divorce, however, legislatures were not necessarily
condoning divorce.  Instead, they were transferring to the judicial system the role of granting divorce
which had historically been under the control of the legislative system, and which was becoming an
increasingly burdensome component of state legislatures’ work .  See RICHARD CHUSED, PRIVATE
ACTS IN PUBLIC PLACES (1995).  Moreover, although legislatures may have been responding to the
increasing demand for divorce, statutory liberalization of divorce may instead be seen as an attempt to
reinforce traditional marital roles and perhaps even slow down the divorce rate because of the
continuation of the onerous requirements for proof of fault.  See J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE
FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
22 (1997).  
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legal norms can reinforce, or conflict, with each other.  
   
I.  HISTORY OF DIVORCE
The story of divorce reform in the United States is often viewed as a narrative of relentless
progression towards increasingly liberal divorce, and towards increasingly liberal roles within, and of,
marriage.  While this is true of the number of divorces, it has not been consistently true of divorce laws
themselves, nor of expectations within marriage.  Instead, the history of divorce involves periods of
greater liberality as well as heightened strictness.  During the mid-nineteenth century, legislatures passed
laws allowing for divorce based on the discretionary basis of incompatibility; when appellate courts
interpreted these provisions, however, they consistently restricted their own discretion.  While
legislatures enacted a variety of provisions allowing for divorce on the basis, for example, of
intoxication, and some courts began to construe more liberally the more traditional grounds of
divorce,26 courts nonetheless carefully scrutinized the litigants’ behaviour, and required that there must
27  See infra note __.
28  As Joel Bishop, one of the first family law treatise writers pointed out quite matter-of-
factedly, a wife could not receive alimony where she was found to be the guilty party. 2 JOEL PRENTICE
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 377, at  302 (1852).    Unless
the husband had breached his marital duties, he had no duty to support his divorced wife.  While
Bishop explains that a few states make some allowance for the guilty woman who has “repented,” he
doubted the prudence of making this into a general rule.  Id. at 304.  Bishop also states that the general
rule was to award custody of children to the innocent party.  Id. at § 532, p. 429.  For a discussion of
women’s situation upon divorce in mid-nineteenth century Indiana, see Norma Basch, Relief in the
Premises: Divorce as a Woman’s Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815-1879, 8 LAW AND
HIST. REV. 1 (1990).  
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be one — and only one – spouse who acted contrary to cultural expectations of marital roles.  Indeed,
there was an ongoing dispute as to whether it was the law, as opposed to other cultural changes, which
affected the divorce rate.27  
Instead, the law of divorce appears to have reflected the dominant images of men, women, and
marriage in Victorian society.   Moreover, while roles within marriage changed during the nineteenth
century, divorce was hardly a source of liberation for women.  Unless they were the innocent parties,
women received little at divorce.28
The history of divorce law provides compelling insights into federalism and family law, and it
offers a doctrinal window into how the obligations of marriage are constructed and understood.  The
transition from the early nineteenth century, when divorce was uncommon and subject to moral
approbation, to the early twentieth century, when divorce became more frequent and less morally
reprehensible, tracks changes in nineteenth century approaches to marriage, rather than a dramatically
increased liberality of divorce grounds.  The law was not irrelevant to the divorce rate, but acted as a
rhetorical brake, at least until the late nineteenth century, to keep marriages together.  Moreover,
29  See JAMES SNELL, IN THE SHADOW OF THE LA W : DIVORCE IN CANADA , 1900-1939 5
(1991)(arguing that marriage and divorce involved “matters of negotiation and compromise and
accommodation of individual needs and expectations, family demands, and the rules and regulations of
the community, of organizations, and of the state”); Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital
Expectations in Nineteenth Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95 (1991); Beverly Schwartzberg, Civil
War Pensions, Address at the American Society for Legal History Conference (Oct. 28, 1999); see
also Laura F. Edwards, The Marriage Covenant is at the Foundation of all Our Rights”: The
Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina after Emancipation, 14 LA W  & HIST. REV. 81, 108
(1997)(after the Civil War, poor “African Americans reserved the right to establish and form families as
they saw fit . . . Both men and women could sever the marital bonds if their partners abandoned their
responsibilities or otherwise mistreated them”); Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen:
Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251,
308 ( 1999) (noting that the right to marriage for African-Americans in the post-Civil War era was of
mixed benefit; while it allowed blacks access to an institution, the state nonetheless used that institution
to punish non-conformers). 
Moreover, the right to marriage was, until the Civil War, unavailable to slaves.  See Franke,
supra; HARTOG, MAN & WIFE, supra note __, at 93; A. Leon Higginbotham and Barbara Kopytoff,
Property First, Humanity Second: The Recognition of the Slave’ Human Condition in Virginia
Civil Law, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 528 (1989).
30  See BASCH, supra note __, at 148.  
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changes in divorce law provide only one window into marital dissolution-- non-legal, or extralegal,
separations provide another lens on the perceived strength of the obligations of marriage. 29 
The article examines in depth various trial reports of famous mid-nineteenth century divorce
cases between 1825-1875.  In reading these reports, I examine the nature of marriage and the
expectations of husbands and wives that they depicted.  These reports are drawn from
contemporaneous newspaper coverage of the trials, and from pamphlets published after the trials which
were sometimes published by the newspapers, and sometimes by the litigants themselves as ways of
publicizing the cases.30 
These reports, while illuminating, instructive and detailed, nonetheless have many limitations. 
31   They are not trial transcripts.  It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that
court reporters became common.  Thus, newspapers and privately published divorce pamphlets were
–and are-- the primary source of information about court proceedings.
32  See Ariela Dubler, Wifely Behaviour: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 957, 965-66 (2000); Melissa Ganz, Trials of the Heart: Courtship and Contract in
Nineteenth Century America (unpublished manuscript on file with the author; need permission to cite
in print).
33  Of course, reported cases have their own limitations as well.  For a discussion of this
critique, and a tentative response, see HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY
317 n.4 (2000).  In many ways, as Professor Richard Chused suggests, the trial court judges in the
cases analyzed in this article  were not hearing the typical divorce case because of the prominence of
the parties and the consequent media scrutiny.  Richard Chused, E-mail, October 1999.  In the
absence of more detailed trial records, it is impossible to know how trial court judges (and juries)
responded more generally to divorce cases.  The 1847 New York case of Groesbeck v. Groesbeck is
probably more typical; it involves simple proof of the defendant’s commission of adultery with Frances
Fleming Charles, with very little cross-examination by his counsel.  TRIAL OF MORTIMER J. SMITH ON
AN INDICTMENT FOR LIBEL ON MISS EMMA WILLIAMS (1847).  The witnesses testified that the
defendant not only purchased groceries for a woman not his wife, but was frequently in her house in the
evening and following morning. Id. at 29-34.  Indeed, Frances Fleming Charles testified as follows:
Q: Did [the defendant husband] visit you [at your residence]?
A.  Yes
Q.  How often during the months of January and February?
A.  He used to come in the evenings pretty often, sometimes every evening.
Q.  Did [the defendant] remain all night?
A.  I do not like to answer that question.
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First, they are not always complete accounts of the underlying trials, because the reporter may have
omitted information, or because only some part of the report survives.31  Second, the reports generally
report on the divorces of people wealthy and famous enough to create public interest in their affairs,
and thus are not representative of all divorce trials.  These reports do, however, provide limited
examples of more general cultural trends.32  Nonetheless, to supplement, I have used media comments
on the trials, and I have also examined about 50 reported appellate cases during the same time
period.33  These reported cases manifest many of the same themes as those reflected in the reports. 
Q.  Did [the defendant] usually stay to breakfast when he came?
A.  Yes, sometimes he did.   
. . .
Q.  After you had retired, did [the defendant] come into your room?
A. Yes.
Q.  Did he remain there till morning?
A.  Yes.
Id. at 32-33.      
Most of the trial reports discussed in this article are from New York courts.  These were
among the most highly publicized trials and the litigants were frequently represented by the most
prominent national practitioners.  Nonetheless, legal historians are becoming increasingly attentive to
regional variations in legal development.  See, e.g., Renee Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the
American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM . & MARY L. REV. 195-199-200 (2000).  Although
New York divorce law is somewhat atypical in that the only grounds for marriage dissolution were
adultery until the late 1960s, on the other hand, I am using the trial reports to discuss roles of men,
women and marriage, not changes in divorce law.    
34  Cf. Hendrik Hartog, Abigail Bailey’s Coverture: Law in a Married Woman’s
Consciousness, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 63, 68 (Austin Sarat and William Felstiner eds. 1993)(in
examining the autobiography of one eighteenth century wife, “we can use the memoirs as a text about
marriage and the changing identity of a married woman.  I am reading her memoirs in search of the
commonsense assumptions about law and marital power . . . that informed her description of her
marriage”).  Professor Hartog also explains that “the details” of any individual story are interesting, even
if the larger cultural story is familiar.  Id. at 65; see Friedman, A Dead Language, supra note __, at
1534-35 (discussing relationship between ideology and appellate caselaw). 
35  For example, in discussing offers of proof,  Mrs. Strong’s lawyer pointed out to Judge
Garvin that there were numerous such proffers in “the case of Forrest,” referring to the 1852 case of
Forrest v. Forrest, published as REPORT OF THE FORREST DIVORCE CASE (1852).  Strong Divorce
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1865, at 2.
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They serve as texts which reflect legal understandings of marriage; while they cannot define the
nineteenth century approach to divorce, they can serve as examples of how divorce was represented.34 
Moreover, the lawyers themselves were often aware of earlier, highly publicized divorce trials.35   
Looking at reports of mid-nineteenth century divorce trials, in the context of general cultural
attitudes towards marriage, has resonance for contemporary efforts to change the marriage and divorce
36  As some scholars note, by the time of the California Commission’s 1966 report
recommending its own vision of no-fault divorce, some states no longer depended on fault for granting a
divorce.  CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON THE FAMILY, REPORT (1966);  MAX RHEINSTEIN,
MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LA W  (1972); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference:
A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987); Walter
Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA . L. REV. 32, 32-35 (1966).
37  Some states continue to provide fault-based grounds for divorce, while others are truly no-
fault.  See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 773
(1996). Similarly, fault continues to be relevant for financial distributions and custody determinations in
some states. Linda D. Elrod & Timothy  B. Walker,  Family Law in the Fifty States, 27 FAM . L.Q.
515, 521 & 534 (1994); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS Ch. 1, Reporter’s notes (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
38  See CHUSED, supra note _,  at 161.
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laws.  First, in reading the stories of earlier divorce trials, we can frame the current debates on fault
divorce.  These nineteenth century cases and statutes show that there has not been a consistent
movement towards divorce liberalization; instead, the movement has developed fitfully, consistently
facing the same philosophical and religious opposition.  Indeed, this history shows that fault has been
critical to allowing divorce; but that non-fault-based grounds have been included as a reflection of a
particular conception of marriage since long before the no-fault revolution.36  Under contemporary
divorce law, while fault may no longer be the basis for procuring the divorces, notions of culpability and
responsibility continue to provide a basis for other aspects of the divorce process.37  
When I began this study, I hoped to show the roots of the mid-twentieth century divorce
revolution, and to contextualize that revolution; while I found that efforts to liberalize divorce were
indeed rooted in the nineteenth century,38 I also found very different images of divorce and of the
judicial role in divorce.  Unlike the divorce courts of the last fifty years, nineteenth century judges were
quite conservative in not allowing divorce.  They found constraints against divorce liberalization not only
39  See Hartog, Marital Exits, supra note __,  at 105, 114.   Ariela Dubler argues that courts
used the doctrine of common law marriage as “a vector of social policy” to privatize dependency
relationships, upholding common law marriage to affirm the appropriate relationship between male
breadwinners and their “spouses.”  Ariela Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common
Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (1998). 
40  Between 1870 and 1880, the divorce rate rose by almost 80%, but the population grew by
only 30.1%; from 1890-1900, the divorce rate increased by 66.6%, while the population grew by only
about 25%.  ROBERT GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA , 1850-1890: VICTORIAN
ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 1 (1982).  Nonetheless, the overall number of divorces
remained small.
41  Almost seventy years ago, Karl Llewellyn observed that divorce itself is simply a sidekick of
what matters more, which is marriage.  Karl Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, Part II, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 262-63 (1933).  He explained that the divorce rate was unimportant so long as
there are more good marriages.  “A ratio of one to two between divorce and marriage . .. would remain
consistent with brilliant national success if, for instance, every person wedded was divorced within three
years, remarried within three more, and happy in the second marriage.”  Id. at 263.
Professor Dirk Hartog convincingly argues that the nineteenth century reformers were more
concerned about remarriage; remarriage, even more than divorce, threatened marriage.  HARTOG,
MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA , supra note __, at 244-45.  Nineteenth century writers were concerned
that easy divorce would call into question the legitimacy of children, and might remove the incentives for
marital partners to work on their marriages.  Id. at 7.  They were also concerned about promiscuity,
14
in doctrine, but also in public morality.  Judges saw their role as applying doctrine to improve society,
and to uphold the marriage contract, rather than enabling the happiness of the individual family members
seeking the divorce.39  It was only when one party had committed a grave fault against the other that a
divorce could be issued.   A history of divorce shows that the transition to our “divorce culture” began
during the nineteenth century,40 rather than during the 1960s, even though the legal rhetoric surrounding
divorce did not experience as radical a change.  
Second, changes in divorce law, and the reports of divorce trials,  illustrate a culture that is in
the process of working out its views towards marriage, and towards men’s and women’s roles within
marriage.41  Even though the divorce rates appear to increase notwithstanding stricter divorce laws, the
“free love” outside of marriage.  BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE OF SUFFRAGE,
SPIRITUALISM , AND THE  SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL (1998).
42  As Robert Griswold explains, the companionate family that emerged during the nineteenth
century was “predicated on the notion of domestic equality between husbands and wives . . . The
[records he studied] reveal that the companionate ideal did, indeed, affect the lives of rural men and
women from all social classes.”  GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE, supra note __, at 5; LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LA W  206, 501 (2d ed. 1985); ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT
EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA (1980).
43  For a discussion of divorce at the end of the nineteenth century, see id.
44  See, e.g., Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry:  Dependency, Eugenics, and
the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860-1920, 23 LA W  & SOC. INQ. 541 (1998).
45  Professor Norma Basch, who has recently published an extremely articulate and persuasive
book about divorce from 1770-1870, argues that the nineteenth century divorce stories illustrate “the
underlying instability of the Victorian marriage synthesis.  They all turn on the gaping contradictions of a
15
laws themselves are a reflection of the larger social forces that express attitudes towards marriage and
divorce.   Divorce itself served to support the institution of marriage because it reinforced role
expectations during marriage, and, in providing an example of what was not allowed in marriage, it
regulated what was allowed to occur within the marriage.  Although divorce in the nineteenth century
has been depicted as a release from marriages which did not come at all close to the companionate
ideal,42 that is, as a corollary to the shifting beliefs towards romantic love, this association is too easy a
summary of nineteenth century changes.43  Instead, underlying the language of companionship, marriage
was a public status that was publicly regulated to serve the purposes of the state,44 and  restrictions on
divorce served state interests rather than individual interests. 
In this article, I read the divorce stories as concerned with the gendered nature of public and
private roles, rather than as concerned with women’s expressions of selfhood.45  Divorce helped to
society devoted to romantic love on the one hand and lifelong monogamy on the other.” BASCH, supra
note _, at 185.  She also believes that divorce served as a symbol of the contest between “the individual
autonomy of women and the social authority of men,” and that it “invested women with a legal
independence that the larger culture either obfuscated or debased.” Id. at 185, 191; see Ruth H. Bloch,
The Revolutionary Legacy of Divorce, H-Net (1/19/2000) (book review).  Instead, I think that the
stories told in divorce trials confirmed women’s gendered role, and did not threaten the social order. 
Women who sought to leave their marriages did so on the utterly acceptable bases that their husbands
had not conformed to their gender code.  While their husbands accused them of flouting the wifely role,
the women fiercely defended themselves against these charges, and accused their husbands of non-
compliance.  Both spouses claimed conformance with the marriage plot.  
46  Indeed, “[m]uch of the modern historical debate about divorce has focused on the
relationship between divorce and autonomy for nineteenth century women.”  RICHARD CHUSED and
WENDY WILLIAMS, GENDER IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (forthcoming 2001)(manuscript at 88, on
file with author)
47  E.g., CARL DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 72 (1980); GRISWOLD, supra note __, at 16.  
48  See, e.g., JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE
IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 17-18 (1990); infra nn. __.   
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frame the expectations of marriage, but those expectations remained deeply hierarchical and
inegalitarian.  Divorce could help the rare woman who was able to live independently of her husband,
but it also served to support the gendered nature of woman’s role in marriage.46  The conventional
history of women’s status in nineteenth century American suggests a movement toward equality in civil
and marital life;47 the divorce stories belie this traditional history.  While women’s role changed, and
domesticity acquired a distinct status, the value of women’s household and marital work became
simultaneously invisible and valueless.48 
The rhetoric of divorce cases additionally shows how restrictions on divorce reinforced
gendered roles throughout society.  Indeed, fault functioned as a code for compliance with gender
norms, regardless of the actual fault grounds set out in the complaint.  Fault served to signal the policing
49  Cf., Posner, Family Law, supra note __, at 257-58 (noting that although social norms are
claimed to be either endogenous or exogenous, the endogenous approach provides a more precise
explanation). 
50  George MacDonald, seeking to find the origins of the companionate marriage model,
describes a man and woman who sought to marry each other for six months in 1884.   1 GEORGE E.
MACDONALD , FIFTY YEARS OF FREETHOUGHT 366 (1929).  Neither the minister nor the justice of the
peace to whom they applied agreed to perform the marriage for them, undoubtedly because this was so
completely contrary to contemporary expectations of marriage.  MacDonald also describes the 1877 
“marriage” between Mrs. H.S. Lake and Prof. W.F. Peck, in which the parties agreed to remain
married ‘’so long as mutual affection shall exist.’” Nonetheless, when the wife sought a legal separation,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided that divorce was not required because there had never
been a legally-recognized marriage.  Id.; see Peck v. Peck, 30 N.E. 74 (Mass. 1892)(nothing required
the court to recognize the parties’ cohabitation as marriage);  see Franke,  supra note __, at 296-97
(discussing judicial hostility to marriages where the parties sought to negotiate their own roles).
51  See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996); Franke, supra note __, at 295; Dubler, supra note __.
52  See Basch, Relief in the Premises, supra note __.
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of gender norms; fault constricted behaviour and punished women and men who transgressed.  Thus,
the divorce trials contain stories not just of the fault grounds, but also of other failures to conform to
gender roles.  Whether the motivations for complying with these norms was external or internal,49 they
were powerful regulators.  
Moreover, stepping back from a focus on divorce alone, and examining the whole institution of
marriage, the development of the image of companionate marriage did not result in legal recognition of
companions marrying whenever they chose or dissolving marriages whenever they chose.50  Instead, the
entry into marriage became increasingly regulated as the nineteenth century closed.51  Marriage
remained a patriarchal institution from which women could exit only if they had the financial means to do
so.52  Although the nineteenth century is widely seen as marking the development of a companionate
53  See also LINDA R. HIRSHMAN AND JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF
SEX 89-92 (1998)(describing the “interlocking” system of male and female roles, which simultaneously
gave women their own sphere of influence but remained subordinated to men).  
54  See Naomi Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225
(1997).
55  See Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States’ Interest in the Marital Status of Their
Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2000)
56  For documentation of the trend towards covenant marriage, see e.g., Herbie DiFonzo,
Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J.  875, 882 (2000).  Even though relatively few couples have
actually entered into a covenant marriage, it has become a potent symbol of all that is wrong and right
about marriage today as it is extensively debated in state legislatures.
57 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996); Lynn  D.
Wardle,  A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex  Marriage,  1996 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 1;  Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry, 1790-1990, 41 HOW . L. REV.
289 (1998)  Of course, some also question the validity of the institution of marriage from a liberal
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egalitarianism within marriage,53 the divorce stories instead show the development of a companionate,
hierarchical marriage in which both men and women were confined by gendered expectations.
Under contemporary law, marriage has become, however, a somewhat different institution that
is both more private, in the sense of more individual control over its incidents, and more public, in the
sense of greater regulation of entry into marriage, the financial effects of dissolution, and examination of
its ongoing effects.54  There remains a strong public interest in marriage, notwithstanding the easy
availability of divorce.55  The state continues to support strongly the institution of marriage by providing
married couples many benefits unavailable to non-married couples, even as it allows no-fault divorce. 
The recent move to “covenant” marriages indicates the continuing respect accorded marriage as
advocates emphasize the long-term nature of marital commitment,56 and the controversy over whether
same-sex couples should be allowed to marry shows the very public nature of marriage as well.57  
perspective.  See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in
Every Marriage,” 79 VA . L. REV. 1535 (1993); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Conversations about the
Intersecting Institutions of Marriage, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 143, 148-49 (1998) (reporting on
Professor Ann Shallek’s questioning of marriage).  
58  The reasons for bringing divorce suits varied by sex.  Men were more likely to sue when
their wives were not “pure” sexually than for any other reason.  Women were more likely to sue when
men failed to fulfill their roles. 
I find that the divorce cases do not reflect the newer expectations of companionate marriage --
"I thought I was marrying my best friend and instead he turned
out to be a dictator.”  Instead, they reflect the fairly traditional roles –  "I thought I was marrying a
breadwinner and protector and instead he turned out to be a bum."  The rhetoric of the divorce cases,
then, turns primarily on disappointment in the older roles, although there re occasional overtones of the
new expectations when litigants chide their spouses for a failure to act in a companionate manner. 
Karen Lystra explains that there was a “contradiction” in the middle-class image of marriage between
the act of conscious choice in deciding to get married and the “mandatory sex-role specific duties
[imposed] upon husband and wife.”  KAREN LYSTRA, SEARCHING THE HEART: WOMEN, MEN, AND
ROMANTIC LOVE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA  192 (1989). 
59  Cf.  Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States,
1830-1934, 130 AM . HIST. REV. 1440 (1998).
60 See sources cited supra note __.
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During the nineteenth century, divorce was so contentious because it called the core meaning of
the institution of marriage into question.58  The law  established and reflected aspirations for marriage
and it attempted to control the number of divorces.59 It is, then, like same-sex marriage today. 
Opponents of same-sex marriage believe that it will destroy the institution of marriage,60 just as
opponents of divorce believed that it too would destroy the institution.  Yet – to continue the analogy –
same-sex marriage today, like divorce a century ago, may change the institution of marriage, but will not
61  Marriage remains an important cultural institution today.  Marriage rates are higher today
than they were a century ago.  See Naomi Cahn, Looking at Marriage, __ MICH. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2000)(book review); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family From the
Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 815-16 (1998).
62  Basch, Relief in the Premises, supra note __.  An at-fault woman rarely received any
property or alimony; even innocent women had to ensure that their husbands complied with their
financial obligations post-divorce.  And, unless the husband was financially secure, divorce did not
provide the woman with any financial guarantees.
63  SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG  70 (1985).
64  Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak”: Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture
of Individual rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. AM . HIST. 463 (1995).   While some feminists,
such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, believed that easier divorce would benefit women by guaranteeing
them autonomy, other feminists protested.  Even starting from the position that marriage benefitted men,
and that women were subordinated in marriage, some feminists still believed in the sanctity of the family;
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destroy it.61
Third and finally, divorce reform points out the complex status of women in the nineteenth
century; divorce would not benefit a woman who was not financially independent of her husband,62 yet,
for wealthy as well as middle-class women, who had separate financial wealth, or were capable of
earning their own living, divorce provided financial protections.63  In supporting the institution of
marriage, divorce provided support to a patriarchal institution.  While women had recourse to divorce
when the consequences of being single in a patriarchal, marriage-focussed society outweighed the
drawbacks of being married, this nonetheless made divorce an extremely difficult “choice.”  It did, in
some senses, support women’s autonomy because it allowed women to initiate a legal action to
dissolve their marriages at a time when women’s capacity even to establish a residence apart from their
husband was in question; autonomy was the goal of many feminists, who advocated raised expectations
with respect to women’s individuality and freedom.64
the debate for feminists was thus between women’s autonomy and family stability.  Echoes of this
debate continue in the debate over no-fault divorce, where women’s freedom to work is seen as a
contributing factor to the rising divorce rate.
65  In explaining why he had attempted to settle the divorce case brought against him, Dr. John
Noel, in a self-interested manner, commented “that no woman can have her name connected with any
public scandal without detriment to her.”  J.V. NOEL, SWORN TESTIMONY OF THE NOEL DIVORCE
CASE Appendix at 2 (1873).
66  See HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA , supra note __, at 244-45, for further
discussion of the fear of remarriage.
67  In the divorce trial reports discussed infra, women were almost invariably accused of
adultery or similar faults, even when they initiated the action.  Their status as plaintiff did not immunize
them countercharges of fault.   
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But, in addition to the financial peril, divorce was fraught with other perils as well.  At the
divorce trials, the lawyers made frequent reference to the consequences to women of having breached
their marital obligations.  Not only would they be deprived of their children, not only might they be
deprived of their property and any right to alimony, they would be shamed and shunned.65  If women
were guilty of adultery or some other fault, then this stain would follow them and their children.  In some
states, they would be unable to marry anyone else.66  By filing suit for divorce for their husbands’ faults,
wives opened themselves to the same accusations, and to a public viewing of any of their alleged
faults.67  The fault rules serve as a prism though which courts could reflect and refract gender. 
This article begins with a brief summary of divorce in American law during the nineteenth
century.  It then turns to a discussion of the narratives presented at divorce trials, focusing on the stories
told about men, women, marriage, and fault.  This study shows the very contested nature of “fault,” the
conflicting images presented of the innocence of each spouse, and the relationship between these
images and culturally-grounded notions of gender.  While these fights over divorce had consequences
68  Judges exercised enormous discretion in deciding whether to grant a divorce upon a finding
of fault.  Moreover, as discussed infra, if both parties were found to be at fault, then divorce could not,
in most jurisdictions, be legally granted.
69  An alternative interpretation is that gendered roles do not matter enough in contemporary
divorce because courts fail to take into account contemporary differences between the roles.  Professor
Carol Rose has shown how the perception (regardless of the reality!) that women are more likely than
men to cooperate results in limiting women’s possibilities for economic advancement.  Carol Rose,
Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA . L. REV. 421, 442 (1992).  Once
women “choose” to cooperate in marital relationships, they find themselves in situations that encourage
more “cooperation,” in which women become the person primarily responsible for maintaining the
household.   Id. at 431.  Rather than “face a scene” when she asks her husband to perform household
work, a woman will simply acquiesce, and there will be a cumulative and disadvantaging effect on her. 
Id. at 440-41.  Professor Rose suggests that women use their alleged taste for cooperation to their own
advantage, cooperating with others who will help them, and learning “selective noncooperation.”  Id. at
456-57. 
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for the reputations of the parties, they also had very real consequences for their financial well-being.
Finally, the article concludes by discussing the acontextual nature of contemporary efforts to
return fault to divorce actions.  In the nineteenth century, fault in divorce served as a facade for general
societal interest in the continuity of marriage; mere proof of fault did not entitle the parties to the granting
of a divorce.68  This article shows how the nineteenth century divorce process reinforced marital roles
through the stories of fault it required.  While the contemporary divorce process no longer serves that
purpose, the legal treatment of parties upon divorce – the impoverishment of women and children, the
inequities in  alimony and property awards – continue to reinforce the fiction that the breadwinner is
entitled to retain the human capital earned during the marriage, and the caretaker is financially penalized
for child care.69  
70  See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LA W  31 (1972).
71  See CHUSED, supra note __ (tracing the evolution from legislative to judicial divorce in
nineteenth century Maryland).  
72  Note, Divorce Laws and the Increase of Divorce, 8 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1910).  The
author noted: “There have been a few changes in the direction of greater liberality, but most of the
changes . . . .have been in the opposite direction, and have made for greater strictness.”  Id. at 388; see
Note, 4 HARV. L. REV. 139 (1890)(noting that laws on divorce remained unchanged from century
beginning to century end, but numbers of divorces increased dramatically); see also NELSON BLAKE,
THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES  135-36 (1962)(discussing the
controversy in the late nineteenth century as to whether the liberality of divorce laws had any effect on
the rate of divorce); DEGLER, supra note __, at 167 (although New York only had one ground of
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II.  DIVORCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Until the mid-nineteenth century in England, only an ecclesiastical court could grant a separation
from bed and board, and only Parliament could grant a full divorce.70  In America, while divorce began
as a legislative proceeding, it became entirely statutory and judicially based during the course of the
nineteenth century.71  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, even the most liberal of divorce laws
allowed divorce only on very limited fault grounds.  By the end of the century, states had experimented
with various different, and more liberal, grounds for permitting divorce, and had, either by statute or
through constitutional amendment, prohibited legislatures from granting divorce.  The number of
divorces increased exponentially from the late eighteenth century through the early twentieth century. 
There was, then, a remarkable transformation in the law surrounding divorce.  Although there are
variations between each state and territory, the law and practice of divorce changed dramatically
throughout the country. 
Even though states experimented with more liberal and restrictive divorce reforms during this
period, the overall number of divorces increased.72  Corresponding to the increasing divorce rate, the
divorce, it awarded more divorces compared to its population than did New Jersey, which had two
divorce grounds).
73  See Reva Siegel, Why  Equal  Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1118 (1997).  
74  RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER:  A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY
137-39, 147 (1988).
75  Id. at 155 (New Hampshire, 1791).
76  See Lindsay, supra note __, at 547.  He notes that an inability to procreate was not grounds
for dissolving a marriage; the focus was on capacity to perform sexually.  Id. at 547-48.  
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expectations of marriage changed, as did the expectations of roles within marriage (even if the roles
themselves changed little).73 
In the seventeenth century, several American colonies allowed divorce for adultery; in
Massachusetts, divorce could be granted only for the wife’s adultery.74  Over the next two hundred
years, legislatures expanded the grounds of divorce to include a series of fault-related bases, such as
extreme cruelty, bigamy, drunkenness, and desertion.  In some states, grounds also included failure of
the husband to act in his role as breadwinner, and failing to maintain a wife became an additional
ground.  At the same time, legislatures began to include so-called non-fault based grounds which
affected the capacity to marry, or remain married, such as impotency75 or imprisonment.  These
additional grounds reflected the expectations that husbands would perform as husbands, through their
presence and their ability to procreate.  They also reflected social goals of keeping sexuality confined to
marriage.76
Courts were required to find some reason for the failure of the marriage, and this reason
required one party to be at fault.  In the United States, as of 1886, there were at least 42 possible
77  CAROLL D. WRIGHT, A REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES ,
1867 TO 1886 113-15 (rev. ed. 1891)(1889).  Wright compiled these statistics pursuant to federal
legislation.  An early committee report on the bill which ultimately required the data collection stressed
the dangers of the multiple and conflicting state laws on the grounds for divorce, as well as on the
varying approaches to the full faith and credit each state accorded to another state’s decree.  Id. at 11;
see James J. White, One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 2096, 2113 (1991).  The extraterritorial effect of divorce decrees remained a complex problem;
even the Supreme Court’s decisions in the mid-1940s have not completely resolved the issue. 
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945); HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA , supra note __, at 279-82; Thomas Reed Powell, And
Repent at Leisure: An Inquiry into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom Nevada Hath Jointed
Together and North Carolina hath Put Asunder, 58 HARV. L. REV. 58 (1945).  Interstate
recognition of marriage and divorce has received significant attention in the context of gay marriage. 
E.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).
78  2 KENT’S COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LA W  106 (12th ed. 1873)(Oliver W. Holmes,
ed.)(1st ed. At p. 88); see JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS : EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD,
INFANCY, AND MASTER AND SERVANT §220b, pp. 339-340 (2d ed. 1884); TAPPING REEVE, THE
LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, OF GUARDIAN AND WARD, OF MASTER AND
SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF THE COURTS OF CHANCERY (1816); for divorce treatises, see,
e.g., HENRY FOLSOM PAGE, A VIEW OF THE LA W  RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT OF DIVORCE IN OHIO,
INDIANA AND MICHIGAN (1850); BISHOP, supra note __.
As discussed infra, the treatises on divorce varied in their attitudes towards divorce.  
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reasons for granting a divorce, ranging from “public defamation” (in Louisiana) to adultery (in all states
and territories).77  Interestingly, women were more likely to be granted a divorce.  As the availability of
divorce grew, it became an increasingly studied and commented upon subject by nineteenth century
treatise writers.  From its first edition, published in 1827(?), through its twelfth edition, published in
1873, Kent’s Commentaries warned, “It is very questionable whether the facility with which divorces
can be proved in some of the states be not productive of more evil than good.”78  Nonetheless, although
Kent and others, such as Tapping Reeve, included divorce in their more general books, it was not until
the middle part of the century that the first two major treatises devoted to divorce appeared: Henry
79  BISHOP, supra note __, at §35, p. 29 (1864 ed.).
80  As Henry Folsom Page pointed out in 1849, more than 30 grounds for divorce.  Page, supra
note __, at  15, n.1.  They included “any behavior repugnant to the marriage contract . . . [or] where
the parties cannot live in peace, and their welfare requires a divorce,” as well as becoming a member of
the Shakers and “marriage with a negro, mulatto or indian.”  Id.
Even the incompatibility statutes, which allowed for divorce when the parties could no longer
live together, were construed to require fault.  See Naomi Cahn, Incompatibility and the History of
Divorce (unpublished manuscript 1999).
81  Van Vechten v. Van Vechten, 4 J.C.R. 502 (1820); see Williamson v. Williamson, 1
Johns. Ch. 488, 490 (1815).  “To guard against all kind of improper influence, collusion, and fraud, it is
the policy of the law not to proceed upon the ground of the consent of parties to a dissolution of the
marriage contract.”  Id.
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Page’s treatise appeared in 1850, while Joel Prentice Bishop’s appeared two years later.  Both books
noted the paucity of materials on divorce, and its neglected status as a topic of American law books. In
judging the availability of divorce, Joel Bishop explained that it should be permitted when marriages no
longer accomplished their original purpose; that is, when one spouse’s failure to perform marital duties
frustrated the purpose of marriage.79
  
III.  Constructions of Fault
To receive a divorce, the aggrieved party was required to show fault on the part of the other
spouse.  Although the type of fault varied between states,80 the necessity of proving fault did not. 
Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, Chancellor Kent refused to allow a consensual divorce because
“the parties cannot lawfully rid themselves of its duties at the pleasure of either or both of them.”81  This
policy continued until the mid-twentieth century, and was enforced through a prohibition on collusion in
82  See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
522-24 (2d ed. 1988).   As Herbie DiFonzo points out, the law against collusion waned in its influence
on spouses’ practices.  DIFONZO, BEYOND THE FAULT LINE, supra note __.  
83  On the fear of collusion, see infra.  Collusion has remained a defense in some states.  See
CLARK, supra note __, at 522.  
84  As one court explained, “The defendant put in the usual answer, denying the adultery
charged in the bill.”  N. Smith v. P. Smith, 4 Paige 432, 433 (1834).
85  “[A]s man has gone up in the path of his improvement, and higher and purer light has shone
around him, still has this institution of marriage . . .remained ever the first among institutions of human
society.”  BISHOP, supra note __, at § 12, p. 10 (4th ed. 1864).
In refusing to uphold a divorce granted below, one court declared, in a rather typical exaltation: 
“Marriage . . . is the most important of the social relations . . .  To its auspicious influence may
be traced the great advances made in civilization, through the elevation of woman to social
equality, the education of children, the refinement of manners . . . .and as such should engage
the most profound solicitude of the legislator and the courts to preserve it unsullied in its purity
and transmit it to posterity with its integrity unimpaired.”  
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obtaining a divorce.82   Parties thus had many incentives to fight proof of fault.  First, without some sort
of dispute, the court might dismiss the case for collusion.83  Second, and perhaps more importantly,
however, proof of fault went to a person’s character.  The trial reports discussed below repeatedly
illustrate both parties’ attempts to claim the mantle of the innocent spouse through three different
strategies: 1) by admitting the transgression and blaming someone else; 2) by denying completely the
fault84; or 3) by claiming the other party was just as much, if not more, at fault.  Fault was deeply
contested because of its very public nature: not only was it a breach of the marriage, it was a breach of
the community’s expectations of gendered marital roles.  Even the noted treatise writer Joel Prentice
Bishop, who believed that divorce should be permitted where one spouse failed to conform to her
marital role, nonetheless also believed in the public nature of marriage, its continuity with the
community.85  Fault involved not just betrayal of the other spouse, but a deep breach of the marital
True v. True, 6 Minn. Rep. 458, 460 (1861).  
86  Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496, 505 (1890).  By the time of this decision, some
states had begun to hold that bigamy and adultery were crimes against the spouse.  See id. citing State
v. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217 (1880) and Lord v. State, 17 Nebraska 526 (1885).
87  Some “guilty” wives did receive alimony and custody. Indeed, in Reavis v. Reavis, the court
precluded evidence of the wife’s desertion from even affecting the determination of the amount of
money necessary to support her and her child.  Reavis v. Reavis, 2 Ill. 242 (1835).
Bishop notes that some at-fault wives might receive property.  For example, he cites an Ohio
case where an adulterous wife received alimony; “[t]he property of the husband had been earned, after
the marriage, by the joint efforts of the two parties.” 2 Bishop, supra note __, at 305, citing to Dailey v.
Dailey.  Other courts also allowed at-fault wives to receive property, even if they were not entitled to
alimony.  See, e.g., Lovett v. Lovett, 11 Ala. 763 (1847)(allowing the court to divide property
appropriately, depending on whether it was acquired through the efforts of husband or wife or jointly). 
Such cases may presage contemporary equitable distribution law which recognizes one spouse’s
contributions to the other’s property.  They also show that courts were not monolithic in enforcing
gendered faultless norms during marriage, perhaps in recognition of wive’s dependent status.  
88  See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA  (1985); Lee E. Teitelbaum,  Family  History and Family Law, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1155.
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relationship.  As the Supreme Court explained in 1890, “Polygamy and adultery may be crimes which
involve disloyalty to the marital relation, but they are rather crimes against such relation than against the
wife.”86    
Third, of course, parties might fight against a finding of fault for various pragmatic reasons.  The
defendant might simply want the marriage to continue.  Or, if the suit was brought by the husband, a
fault finding against his wife would excuse him from various forms of property distribution and could
serve to preclude her from receiving child custody; she thus had strong, social, and personal incentives
to fight against the accusation.87  Although the child custody law during the nineteenth century
developed a tender years preference for mothers,88 the preference only applied if she was not at fault.
89  As Professor Basch explains, “female compliance in the all-important area of chastity was
far more central to the Victorian ideology of marriage than either male compliance or male
benevolence.”  BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note _, at 172.  The chastity focus
explains, of course, the virtual universality of adultery as a ground for divorce.  Chastity also, of course,
ensures the legitimacy of children born to the marriage.  For analysis  of cultural attitudes towards
sexual morality in the late nineteenth century, see DAVID J.  PIVAR,  PURITY  CRUSADE:  SEXUAL
MORALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL, 1868-1900 (1973); Jane Larson, “Even a Worm Will Turn at
Last”: Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN 1 (1997).
90  For a discussion of alternative relationships, see LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE
LOVE OF MEN: ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO
THE PRESENT (1981); Susan Carle, Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer’s Persona, 22
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 239, 271 (1999); William  N.  Eskridge,  Jr., A History of Same-Sex
Marriage, 79 VA . L. REV. 1419 (1993).
91  For a discussion of stock stories,  see generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images
of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social
Ills?,   77 CORNELL  L. REV. 1258 (1992);  Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering,  34 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1984); see also Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R-
C.L. L. REV. 353, 354 nn.3-4 (discussing characteristics of narrative).  Professor Griswold points out
the formulaic language of divorce complaints, in which petitioners sought to claim the moral high ground. 
ROBERT GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE IN VICTORIAN AMERICA , 1800-1900 21 (1986)(Legal
History Working Paper).  
Professor Basch, in explaining why she has titled her book “Framing American Divorce”, notes
that litigants often rigged evidence to support a finding of divorce, and that the law, together with the
literature about divorce, helped people frame their thoughts about divorce.  BASCH, FRAMING
AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note _, at 6-7. 
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This section also shows how lawyers manipulated images of men and women; women and men
who transgressed their marital roles seemingly deserved to be punished by divorce.   In addition,
women were punished for failing to conform to expectations of their sex.89  Fault violated public,
marital, and gendered expectations; consequently, violators could be deprived of their marriages in a
society where marriage continued to be, for men and women, the defining status of adulthood.90  There
are various stock stories that appear in these reports,91 stories of men’s failures to provide, of women’s
promiscuity, and marriages that failed because of the parties inability to get along with each other. 
92  See also CHUSED, PRIVATE ACTS, supra note __, at 160-61 (there was a “dissonance
between the terms of general divorce law and the realities of married lives”).
93  Others have also discussed some of these reports, albeit for different purposes.  Professor
Norma Basch analyzes, among others, the Forrest, Beardsley, and Burch cases, which are also
discussed infra.  She reads the cases to show the “gendered tensions” involving women who “had
sorely tested the limits of their husbands’ authority, thereby raising the specter of female autonomy.” 
BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note _, at 152.  I examine the cases simply to show the
gendered nature of their narratives and the hierarchical nature of marriage.  
Professor Hendrik Hartog analyzes (among others) the Forrest case.  HARTOG, MAN AND
WIFE IN AMERICA , supra note __.   Neither of them has (yet) addressed the Strong and Noel cases. 
94  BEARDSLEY, supra note __, at 68.
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Although adultery was the legal channel for dissolution, the narratives of these marriages underlying the
stock stories are more complex than mere tales of infidelity.92  These stories reveal that the expectations
in marriage remained quite conventional, and divorce was only available when one spouse had
transgressed these traditional marital roles and values.  The trial accounts93 dramatize the popular role
expectations of nineteenth century marriage. 
A.  Gendered roles – women
This section briefly describes several of the noted mid-nineteenth century divorce cases,
showing how they simultaneously adhered to, and manipulated, gender norms.  Each party claimed the
mantle of compliance with gendered roles, while their opponents alleged their noncompliance; litigants
used the cultural norms associated with men and women to support their stories. 
1.  Beardsley v. Beardsley: At the beginning of his closing argument on behalf of Mr. Beardsley,
Charles Busteed offered an apology: “At no time or place, and under any circumstances, is it desirable
to be the accuser of a woman. . . . Her voice is man’s first cheer and her hand his last pillow.”94  This
chivalry, which served to reinforce the gentlemanly nature of his client,  was nonetheless short-lived.  He
95  Id. at 71, 75, 76.
96  Id. at 76.  The pamphleteer noted that, during this closing argument, the courtroom was full,
and many jurors and spectators “were moved to no unmanly tears.”  Id.
97  Id. at 73.
98  Id. at 5.
99  Id. at 73.  The lawyer made an explicit appeal to the white male jurors’ expectations of their
own wives, by reinforcing women’s role to care for men, and men’s right to expect this caring from
their wives.
Lawyers seemed conscious of jurors’ norms.  For example, in seeking to exclude evidence in
the Strong case, Mr. Strong’s lawyer argued, “I don’t speak to you as a husband and a father, but as a
judge of the rules of law and evidence.”  Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1865, at 2.  
31
continued by describing Mrs. Beardsley as “wanton,” “the most brazen strumpet that ever defied God
and men,” and a woman who “profanes a lawful couch with her carrion form.”95   He mocked her
domesticity, asking, “What shall be said of the wife and mother, who, day by day, all the day long, is in
the arms and bed of an illicit passion?”96  He suggested that she was not truly maternal because she did
not really want to see her child during her separation from her husband.97  The introductory history of
the case describes Mrs. Beardsley as “fonder of promenading Broadway and visiting places of
amusement without her husband than was consistent with wifely propriety.”98  Consistent with gendered
marital norms, the lawyer’s rhetoric reinforces the gentlemanliness of Mr. Beardsley, and the
unladylikeness of his wife.  When Mr. Beardsley returned from work each night, he was not “met with
the caresses which were his due, and which little attentions we all expect.”99
In defending Mrs. Beardsley, her lawyer, Chauncy Shaffer, focused on her filial character;
100   “You saw that woman whose heart was crushed, and who with blood crimsoning her lips,
was borne out of the Court on her father’s arm.”  Id. at 67; see id. at 31.  
101   Id. at 59.  In his closing, he also referred to Mr. Beardsley’s refusal to allow her to have
her child “for even one night.”  Id. at 67.
During his examination of Mrs. Beardsley’s mother, Mr. Shaffer attempted to show that Mr.
Beardsley had prevented his wife from having access to their child.  Id. at 37.
102  Id. at 66.
103  Id. at 62. 
104  Professor Basch explains that Mrs. Beardsley had exhibited such deviant behaviour that,
unlike other female divorce litigants, she was not given the benefit of doubt.  BASCH, FRAMING
AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note __, at 168.    Professor Basch discusses how the press portrayed
Mrs. Beardsley as deviant and deceptive.  See id.  Interestingly, Professor Basch characterizes Mrs.
Beardsley’s defense as “no less fantastic than the accusations she faced.” Id. at 170.  
Contrary to this image, I believe, as discussed supra, that Mary Beardsley was framed by a
husband desperate to divorce her.  Moreover, other women who seemingly exhibited “deviant”
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indeed her relationship with her father was literally on display in the courtroom.100  Turning to her
relationship with her child, he appealed to the jurors’ understanding of her role as a mother, and
commented on how contrary to womanly nature it would have been for her to enter into the alleged
second marriage: Shaffer remonstrated “[i]t is alleged that she, foregoing . . . all the claims of her only
child upon her . . . “ committed bigamy.101  In addition, he repeatedly proclaimed his client’s innocence,
and explained that a finding of guilt would malign “the character of a woman unjustly.”102  And, he
allowed that, “if [Mrs. Beardsley] is not an angel it is because her nose is so sharp.”103  The defense
thus focused on her gendered performance as daughter, mother, and wife, and on her compliance with,
rather than her alleged flouting of, culturally expected norms.  Ultimately, the jury found Mrs. Beardsley
not guilty of bigamy, but guilty of adultery; because she had shown that her husband was also guilty of
adultery, no divorce was decreed.104  The jury seems to have accepted the incredibility of Mrs.
behaviour, such as Catherine Forrest, were allowed a divorce.  
Alternatively, as discussed infra, it may simply be the case that both Mr. and Mrs. Beardsley
were confined to telling certain stories.  Or, as Dirk Hartog has suggested, Mrs. Beardsley may in fact
be one of the only female bigamists yet identified; she simply entered into a second marriage as a cover
for her adultery.  Conversation between author and Hendrik Hartog, Oct. 22, 1999.
105  N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1865, at 2.
106  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1865, at  2 (testimony of Robert Roosevelt, author of Lake Superior
Fishing).
107  N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1865, at  2 (opening address of Mr. Cram).  While this might have
constituted the crime of adultery, this did not constitute the crime of incest.   Use of the term “incest,”
then, must have been a rhetorical flourish to exaggerate her actions.
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Beardsley committing literal bigamy, but was unwilling to find her faultless.
2.  Strong v. Strong:  In his 3-hour opening address on behalf of Mr. Strong, Henry Cram explained
that the Strongs had enjoyed a very happy marriage because his client had “quiet domestic habits,” and
cared deeply for his family.105  Indeed, one of his final witnesses testified that Peter Strong was a
devoted, and doting father.106    It was not until Edward Strong came to live with his brother in their
“quiet country home . . . [that]  incest crept into that circle.”107  He attacked the womanly nature of
Mary Strong.  He focused on various oral and written confessions that she had made, as well as her
neglect of wifely duties. After one of their children had read a chapter from the Bible, Mrs. Strong
“seemed most strangely and violently agitated, and rising from her chair, flung herself at his feet and
implored him to forgive her for her long neglect and indifference . . . Then arose the image . . .  [in Peter
Strong’s mind of his wife’s] family altar [that] had been so foully desecrated  . . . Plaintiff remained
crushed and silent, until she arose and went to the door of the room.  Plaintiff said ‘Where are you
108  Id.
109  Id.
110  Id.
111  ELBRIDGE T. GERRY, THE STRONG DIVORCE CASE 34 (1865).
112  See HELENA MICHIE, THE FLESH MADE WORD: FEMALE FIGURES AND WOMEN’S BODIES
(1987); SANDRA GILBERT AND SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE ATTIC: THE WOMAN
WRITER AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY IMAGINATION 54 (1979).
113  STRONG, supra note __, at 89-90.
114  DIANE PRICE HERNDL, INVALID WOMEN: FIGURING FEMININE ILLNESS IN AMERICAN
FICTION AND CULTURE, 1840-1940 25 (1993).  Professor Herndl classifies three different, albeit
overlapping, approaches to female illness among contemporary writers: first, many see illness as the
result of women’s cultural subordination, second, some see illness as resistance to the surrounding
culture, a method by which women redefined and resisted their roles; and third, some see illness as a
form of power that women gained and exercised in manipulative, artistic, or sentimental ways.  Id. at 5-
7. 
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going?” . . . She answered: ‘To mingle with lost creatures like myself.’”108  When she began her
“crime,” he explains somewhat scandalously, she was  pregnant.109  Finally, when her lover left her,
“God took one of her children away”110 as punishment for her transgressing behaviour.  
By contrast, of course, her lawyer repeatedly defended her virtue, and her role as wife and
mother, notwithstanding the slight problem of a signed confession.  He described her as religious, a
woman “who has eschewed and avoided worldly amusements.  Acts of charity and religion have filled
up her leisure time.”111  Moreover, in compliance with standards of female physicality,112 she was
physically weak, and suffered from the female ailment of menorrhagia.113  She conformed to the images
established by the nineteenth century’s “‘cult of female frailty,’”114 a cult that may have been based in
115  See id. at 25-30 (discussing reasons why women’s health may have actually worsened in
the nineteenth century, such as the confining nature of corsets, women’s lack of knowledge about their
own bodies, as well s the use of illness as a means for women to gain some respite from their work).
116  Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1865, at 1.
117  ISAAC H. BURCH, THE ONLY COMPLETE REPORT OF THE BURCH DIVORCE CASE 17
(1860).
118    REPORT OF THE FORREST DIVORCE CASE 7 (1852)(emphasis added).  
119  She argues that the trial pamphlets exploited divorce as a “‘sentimental” event in which
women were the passive victims.  Basch at 155.  For further discussion of nineteenth century notions of
sentimentality, see KAREN HALTTUNEN , CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN : A STUDY OF
MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA , 1830-1870 (1982); Laura Hanft Korobkin, The
Maintenance of Mutual Confidence: Sentimental Strategies at the Adultery Trial of Henry Ward
Beecher, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1995).
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the reality of health care for women.115  Like Mrs. Beardsley, Mrs. Strong’s family members were
evident and supportive of their appropriately domestic family member.  Indeed, while Mrs. Strong was
not in the courtroom, her father, “an elderly, quite mannered gentleman,”116 was.   
3.  Other trial reports: Likewise, in the celebrated Burch v. Burch case, the maternal attributes of Mrs.
Burch figured prominently.  In concluding his opening statement, her counsel explained that, regardless
of the consequences of a guilty finding for her, she had “two dear children.  The verdict of the jury
would either clear her children’s reputation, or stain them for life.”117  In Forrest v. Forrest, the wife,
Catharine Forrest was praised as “a woman who has endeared herself to all who have seen her in the
domestic circle.”118  
As Professor Basch points out, women in divorce trials were often depicted as victims; there
was an attempt to strip them of agency, to reinforce the authority of men and restrict the autonomy of
women,119 to make them victims of conspiracies of men.  I also think that women were depicted as just
120   Hofmire v. Hofmire, 7 Paige 60, 61 (1838).
121  See KAREN HALTTUNEN , MURDER MOST FOUL: THE KILLER AND THE AMERICAN
GOTHIC IMAGINATION 183-86, 206-07 (1998) (discussing the use of the angel/whore dichotomy in
nineteenth century murder trials); Cott, supra note __ (cult of domesticity); ANN DOUGLAS, THE
FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1977); HAZEL CARBY, RECONSTRUCTING WOMANHOOD
26-27 (1987)(contrasting  images of black women with the cult of true (white) womanhood’s image of
modesty).
The cult of domesticity idealized lives available only to a limited number of women, who were
stereotypically white and middle class.  Given that these cases typically concerned people with enough
money to pay for a divorce, middle-class standards would have been applicable (and aspirational).
122  See ROBERT GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE IN VICTORIAN AMERICA , 1800-1900
21 (1986)(Legal History Working Paper)(“The language lawyers and townspeople used in divorce
litigation reveals how local courts became a theater for the reaffirmation of basic cultural values . .
.Lawyers, for example, drew upon a similar vocabulary when highlighting the character of their female
clients”).
123  The actual divorce cases thus reinforce conventional notions of marriage, and of
appropriate roles within it.  See MacComb, supra note __, at 4-5 (as a result of the increasing grounds
for divorce, “the ideal of marriage–and especially the expectations governing the feminine domestic
role–was ever more strictly encoded.  Thus while divorce law seemed a liberating mechanism that was
disruptive of marriage . .. it in fact maintained the domestic sphere [and] seemed to guarantee that the
institution of marriage would remain unquestioned and unreformed”).  Marriage remained a social
status, subject to public governance and scrutiny.  Breach of a marital role also disrupted individual and
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that – women.  As one 1838 judge explained in upholding the wife’s divorce, the defendant had “left
the bed of his young and virtuous wife . . .to enjoy the embraces of a worthless common prostitute.”120 
The cult of domesticity, together with the virgin/whore dichotomy,121 were thriving in divorce rhetoric.
In defending their clients’ behaviour, their lawyers used conventional images of women.122 
Women were supposed to be submissive, and they were also the natural guardians of the home. 
Lawyers for their husbands emphasized their transgressions of womanly and wifely expectations.  The
reports are almost transparent in their battles over the norms of female behaviour as each side agreed
on what women should do, and disagreed over what this particular woman had done.123  This is true
gendered characters.  
124   For discussion of the plots in these books, see HERNDL, supra note __, at 55-60, 187.
125  EMMA D.E.N. SOUTHWORTH, RETRIBUTION 127 (1856).  “Yes, Hester is marked for the
GRAVE.  No one sees it . . .  no one but me. . . .And now [I] would be sure to succeed in winning
him.”  Id.  Although not a story of divorce -- it was published in 1856 -- the best friend does die
conveniently and rather quickly, thereby allowing her husband to marry the alleged friend.
126  Id. at 200.  Juliette is never happy, however, and her marriage disintegrates as well.  The
retribution of the title is exacted against her, and the author is clearly writing from a particular
perspective that condemns the immorality of Juliette’s behaviour.
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not only with respect to the married women who were the often unseen and unheard parties to the
trials, but also with respect to the other women at issue, the witnesses and adulterers.  For example, in
the Beardsley case, Mrs. Beardsley’s best friend, Miss Alice Greenwood [sic],  is the woman alleged
to have participated in the divorce conspiracy so that she could marry Alfred.  It was even suggested
that she procured the abortion of Alfred’s child.  
The narrative of the ambiguously bad woman who plots against her friend with her friend’s
husband is easily recognizable from nineteenth century fiction in novels ranging from E.D.E.N.
Southworth’s 1849 novel Retribution to Henry James’s The Wings of the Dove, published in 1902.124 
In Retribution, Juliette Sommers schemes to ensure that the wealthy and handsome husband of her best
friend, Hester Dent, falls in love with her; when she sees the signs of consumption in her best friend, she
does nothing to alert her friend to the disease.125   Very shortly after Hester dies, Juliette Sommers
marries her friend’s husband.126  Throughout much of Henry James’s The Wings of the Dove, Kate
Croy and Merton Densher, who are secretly engaged, plot against Kate’s alleged best friend, Millie
127  This is, of course, a simplification of a complex plot. 
128  As Norma Basch points out, men were obligated to fulfill “the often conflicting roles of
provider and companion.”  BASCH, FRAMING DIVORCE, supra note __, at 166.  Robert Griswold
explores the depictions of men in divorce trials in California.  GRISWOLD, supra note __, at 92-140. 
He explores the rising expectations of men as companions, and the corresponding power of women to
enforce those expectations; he asserts that this changed role for men reflected a belief in more
egalitarian, and less hierarchical, marriages.  Id. at 119.  While I generally agree with Professor
Griswold’s extremely perceptive and acute observations about divorce trials, I do not think that these
trials show that marriage was becoming significantly less hierarchical.  See infra nn. __; see also Reva
Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-
1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994)(discussing preservation-through-transformation in the context of
inequalities in marriage).  
129  In commenting on the 1842 Dunham divorce case, Professor Basch observes that the
husband had transgressed the masculine role more than his wife had violated the norms of wifely
behaviour, and the jury thus found for the wife.  BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE,  supra note
__, at 154.  
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Threader, ultimately causing her death when Millie understands that Merton does not truly love her.127 
The contested images of the bad women in the divorce trials similarly drew upon deeper cultural tropes
that were echoed in, and echoed by, novels. 
B.  Gendered Roles –Men 
The stories within the divorce trials amplify the role expectations of husbands.  Men were
supposed to provide for and protect their wives, as well as, perhaps secondarily, to serve as lovers and
companions.128  The images of men that emerge from these trials show the constraints inherent even in
the dominant role in marriage.  The ideology of masculinity served as a critical balance to the ideology
of femininity; domesticity (and marriage) depended on both the husband and wife performing their
roles.129  During the nineteenth century, men were increasingly defined with respect to their
130  See LYSTRA, supra note __, at 129-135 (discussing the strong connection between
masculinity and a family’s economic stability).
131  E.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, CONJUGAL BONDS (1999)(newly freed black men were
encouraged to find jobs so that they could support their wives).
132 WRIGHT, supra note _, at  169.   While the number of neglect divorces pales in comparison
to the number of desertion divorces -- over 75,000 during this same time period -- failure to provide
was the most frequent ground for divorce in California and Michigan. Id.  Given that the periods for
divorce based on desertion and failure to provide were generally similar, See id. at 89-117, the failure
to provide ground may have reflected the husband’s failure to support his family, his noncompliance
with the cultural expectations of his role.
133  See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence and couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C.L. REV. 265, 281 (2000). 
134  His counsel defended against the adultery charges, claiming that they had never happened,
he observed, however, that they “could not claim from Mr. Beardsley any exemption from the ordinary
failings of man.  We shall not hold that he has lived in New York without seeing its sights–without a
look at the elephant, gentlemen, if you please.”  Id. at 11-12.  Mr. Busteed continued by noting that
Mr. Beardsley’s alleged adultery was not nearly as serious a breach of the marital obligation as was
Mrs. Beardsley’s.  Id. at 12.  For discussion of Mr. Busteed’s use of the sexual double standard, see
BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note __, at 170-71.
39
breadwinning.  It became important to engage in profitable work outside of the home.130 A man who
did not make enough money to support his family was not a real man.131  The divorce cases reveal an
emphasis on a man’s economic success as a determining factor in his marital success.  
Many states included, as a basis for divorce, a man’s failure to provide adequately for his wife;
his failure as a breadwinner could constitute a basis for divorce.  For example, between 1867-1886,
there were almost 8,000 divorces granted to wives because of their husbands’ failure to provide; not
surprisingly, there were no such divorces granted to husbands132 because there was no such obligation
on the wife’s part.133  
The accusations against Alfred Beardsley included not just his adultery134, but also his failure to
Mrs. Beardsley’s counsel condemned this behaviour, alleging that Mr. Beardsley :had plucked
one rose; evidently that floral bouquet did not satisfy his taste, for we find him careening through . . .
New York.”  BEARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 59.
135  BEARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 31.
136  STRONG, supra note __, at 58.  Mrs. Strong’s counsel noted that “When a lawyer does not
expend his smartness upon the world, but goes to his own fireside, or to that of some family into which
he has married . . . he is a thorn in the side of their happiness.”  Id. at 32.
137  STRONG, supra note __, at 33, 58, 59.  As he argued, “If, indeed, courts were not
sufficiently alert in maintaining on the part of the husband, jealously to watch over the society, conduct
and habits of his wife, it might occasion an irreparable injury to the great bonds of human happiness and
peace.  Id. at 43 (quoting BYRNE’S HANDY BOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
17)
138  N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1865.  Mr. Strong “was all this time kind and attentive, and gratified
her every wish.”  Id.
139  BURCH, supra note __, at 5.
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support his wife.  In his opening statement, Mrs. Beardsley’s counsel noted that Mr. Beardsley had
represented himself as financially comfortable while he was courting her.  Shortly after the marriage,
however, he began living with her family and received money from them to start his own business.135  
Indeed, one of her brothers gave him $5,000, and another gave him $7,000, which he allegedly spent
on prostitutes.  Similarly, Peter Strong was a lawyer who was not practicing, and never established a
separate residence for their family.136  He allegedly neglected his wife, and left her alone so much that
she naturally developed the conviction that he no longer loved her.137  By contrast, his lawyer claimed
that Mr. Strong was an extremely attentive and indulgent husband who was home except for occasional
business-related absences.138  Isaac Burch only married his wife after making inquiries about her
financial circumstances, and then borrowed money from her friends.139  He ultimately forced her to
140  Id.
141  BURCH, supra note __, at 16-17.
142  As discussed infra, although the Married Women’s Property Acts allowed women limited
access to some of their earnings during marriage, even these Acts supported the economic dependence
of wives.  The fathers of wealthy women could create separate estates for them, but this was a
comparative rarity.  See, e.g., MARYLYNN SALMON,  WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA  (1986).  
143 See Hartog, supra note __, at 155-161.  The generosity of the husband in supporting his
wife became an issue in many divorce cases.  See also C. Robert Haywood, Unplighted Troths:
Causes of Divorce in a Frontier Town Toward the End of the Nineteenth Century, 13 GREAT
PLAINS Q. 211, 215 (1993)(in her cross petition explaining the falseness of her husband’s accusations
of adultery, one woman described him as “‘stingy and miserly’”).
144  See Michele Dickerson, To Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses be Forced to
Pay Each Other’s Debts?, 78 B.U.L. REV. 961, 969 (1998); see generally Note, The Unnecessary
Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767 (1984).
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“beg” for money from her friends and relatives.140  He thus allegedly married his wife for money
and then treated her coldly, explained counsel for Mary Burch.141     
The importance of breadwinning underlies the dependent nature of wives; husbands maintained
financial control over all property during the marriage.142  Although men were supposed to provide
“necessaries” for their wives, this obligation was extremely difficult to enforce if men failed to do so.143 
Similarly, in order to receive reimbursement, the creditor was required to prove that the item purchased
actually was necessary, that it had not already been provided by the husband, and that the wife could
not pay for it herself.144  Moreover, as further evidence of their compliance with appropriate and
submissive wifely behaviour, women who were found to be at fault were generally precluded from
receiving any alimony or property.
The importance of companionship is a continuing theme in these cases.  For example, in Burch
145  The reports of this case were so dramatic that, almost 150 years later, they reappeared, in a
somewhat fictionalized manner, as a novel.  DAVID DELMAN, THE BLUESTOCKING: THE STORY OF THE
FAMOUS FORREST DIVORCE CASE (1994).  
146  FORREST, supra note __, at 68.  
147  Id. at 144.
148  Id. And this witness was the husband of one of Catherine Forrest’s best friends.
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v. Burch, not only was Mr. Burch accused of marrying his wife for money, however, he also allegedly
treated her coldly.  This was contrary to the cultural ideal that husbands were supposed to treat their
wives warmly and to provide companionship.  Further, in the celebrated Forrest v. Forrest case,145
Catherine Forrest alleged that her husband was “one who took me from my father’s hearth, promising
to cherish and protect me, and now after wearing out in his service all the bright years of my youth,
seeks to cast me forth.”146  Edwin Forrest’s counsel, in his defense, asked the jury: “whether, in the
whole of th[eir] correspondence, from first to last, there is any want of love or affection in regard to his
wife: Is there anything in them except evidences of the most devoted admiration and extreme
kindness?”147   In further defense, Mr. Forrest’s counsel mentioned the existence of only one witness
who ever saw him exhibit any “rudeness” to his wife.148  Wives were entitled to expect friendship and
respect from their husbands, and husbands expected to fulfill this aspect of their role.
The final image of men that appears in these cases is as controlled by their appetites -- as
consumers of pornography and drink and as customers of prostitutes.  Although there was certainly a
sexual double standard, and prostitution seems to have been more generally accepted during the
149  The perceived existence of this double standard is clear in the opening and closing
statements of counsel for Mr. Beardsley; even though the jury did not apply the double standard to Mr.
Beardsley, it was a pervasive enough belief that counsel could attempt to invoke it.  
Certainly for single men, contact with prostitutes was not subject to severe sanction.  See
GRISWOLD, supra note __, at 117 (single men “described their contacts with prostitutes in a matter-of-
fact, guilt-free manner”); HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, THE AGE OF THE BACHELOR: CREATING AN
AMERICAN SUBCULTURE 169 (1999)(“From the late-eighteenth century onward, American cities
sustained a sexual service establishment that catered to a market consisting primarily of single men”).  
150  Noel v. Noel, 24 N.J. Eq. 137, 140 (N.J. Ch. 1873); see SWORN TESTIMONY OF THE
NOEL DIVORCE CASE, TOGETHER WITH AN EXPLANATION (1873).  The Vice-Chancellor explained
“The possession and use of them by a physician are quite as incapable of apology or palliation–nay,
more so–than would be in the case of a vulgar, uneducated reader.”  Noel, supra note __, at 140.  
151  E.g., SWORN TESTIMONY OF THE NOEL DIVORCE CASE, supra note __, at 18-21, 25
(testimony of William H. Crosby and of George Chamberlain).  Several witnesses also testified to his
repeated intoxications. 
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nineteenth century than today,149 courts and advocates condemned married men for succumbing to
these passions.  As the Vice-Chancellor explained about Dr. John Noel, the evidence of “obscene
pictures and books,” while not necessarily proving “the licentiousness of his conduct, exhibit painfully
the impurity and pollution of his mind.”150  At the trial, his wife produced many witnesses who
repeatedly testified to Dr. Noel’s collection of obscene books, and his efforts to visit houses of ill-
repute.151  This evidence of the beastly nature of his character seems designed to corroborate evidence
of his adultery.
While men were able to exist outside of the confines of the domestic sphere, they too were
constrained by the cult of domesticity.    For example, notwithstanding his counsel’s repeated
invocations of the sexual double standard for men and women, Mr. Beardsley was found guilty of
adultery.  
152  STRONG, supra note __, at 112.
153  He repeatedly emphasized that Mr. Strong was legally obligated to protect his wife from
seduction, and suggested that Mr. Strong may have deliberately sought to tempt his wife in order to
procure a divorce so that he could marry a wealthier woman.  Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 1865, at 3.  He pointed out that, “where the wife is in the house in the presence of the husband
and living under his roof the law presumes she is under his coercion.”  STRONG, supra note __, at 39. 
By acknowledging that Mrs. Strong was completely under her husband’s control,   the lawyer echoed
norms of both wifely and husbandly behaviour.
The concept of the husband’s control over his wife even defeated the wife’s alleged
condonation of his adultery in an 1830 case.  L. Wood v. C. Wood, 2 Paige 108 (1830).  The
Chancellor noted that condonation was presumed when the husband cohabited with his wife after he
knew of her fault, but condonation “ought not to be held a strict bar against the wife.  She is in a
measure under the control of her husband.”  Id. at *111. 
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C.  Whose Fault?
In all of these reports, there is a battle over fault.  The allegedly innocent spouse who has
brought the suit is countercharged as an adulterer, and/or a drunk, and/or unable to provide for his wife.
The parties contest who is at fault, and who is responsible for the fault that exists. Each party’s
individual character becomes an issue, and the jurors are exposed to diverse forms of character
evidence.   Yet the individual characteristics of fault play into highly gendered forms of behaviour.
The parties consistently employed at least one of three  strategies in order to place the blame
elsewhere: denying completely, admitting with an explanation, and countercharging.  Mrs. Strong’s
lawyer used all three strategies.  First, he denied the existence of any adultery, and alleged instead that
Peter Strong himself committed adultery with an abortionist.152  Then, he admitted with an explanation:
Peter is alleged to have connived in his wife’s adultery, and to have forgiven her for it.  Her actual fault,
if any, is, at least by her counsel, ascribed to him; as her husband, he was responsible for Mrs.
Strong.153  He had even elicited testimony from Mrs. Strong’s father that he had chided Peter Strong
154  Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1865, at 1 (“I told him there were duties for a
husband as well as a wife, and he could not have been entirely unaware of what every one else saw”).
155  STRONG, supra note ___, at 18.
156  BEARDSLEY, supra note __, at 12.
157  Accusing a woman of sex outside of marriage served to make her into a bad woman,
thereby capable of many terrible acts.  See HALTTUNEN , MURDER MOST FOUL, supra note __, at 206-
07.
158  FORREST, supra note __, at 7.
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for failing to protect his wife from his brother’s “attentions.”154 Consequently, he should have been
aware of his brother’s attention to her, and ended it.  Because he did not, he connived in the resulting
adultery.155  His wife cannot be at fault because she is not responsible for her own actions.   Because of
her womanly behaviour, because of the gendered role expectations in marriage, she cannot be culpable. 
Women’s existence separate from her husband’s control was still an extremely contentious issue, and
her lawyer used her husband’s dominance to excuse his wife’s actions.  To an all-white, male jury, this
appeal would have had strong resonance.  
By contrast, Mr. Beardsley’s counsel charged that Mrs. Beardsley was not seduced, but
“coolly and deliberately” committed bigamy.156  She lured her lover into sin.157  Her intent, her agency
make her culpable for her faults.  Her defense was that she was the victim of a conspiracy; she was not
responsible for the adultery.   To prove her innocence, Catherine Forrest’s counsel explained that his
client would rather “sink into the grave, than live the life of an injured woman,”158 with the implication
that a finding of guilt was equivalent to a death sentence because she would be unable to bear the
shame. 
159  BURCH, supra note __, at 43-44.  In another confession, she explained that she was
pregnant at the time.  Id. at 43.
160  BURCH, supra note __, at 43.  See GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE, supra note __,
at 35 (noting that courts were suspicious about confessions because of the power of a wrongful
accusation of adultery against a woman’s honor and because of husbands’ power over their wives in
compelling them to sign; courts required additional evidence to substantiate a confession).  One of Mrs.
Strong’s counsel argued that confessions of adultery were the “worst” form of evidence, and required
corroboration.  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1865, at 1.  
In an 1858 San Francisco case, a judge instructed a jury that the wife’s signed confession,
without corroboration of the underlying events, and made under “peculiar circumstances”, should be
given “but little weight, and must be received with great caution.”  TRIAL ON THE SUIT OF AUGUSTA
ROONEY VS. SAMUEL B. ROONEY 21-22 (1858). 
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Several of the women - Mary Burch and Mary Strong – signed confessions indicating that they
had betrayed their marital vows.  These confessions were subsequently explained away as not really
confessing anything, or as forced confessions of false transgressions, or as the products of the women’s
weakened states brought on by someone else (their husbands or their lovers) or because of their
physical conditions.  Mary Burch’s confession states that her seducer was “unceasing” and tried to
“ruin” her:  
I resisted him, God in Heaven knows, and for nearly three months; but it seems as if I were
infatuated, and after so long repelling his advances, I to my shame, confess that he finally
conquered, and on the 14th day of Oct., 1857, I fell a victim to his damnable seductive arts. 
On that day had criminal connection with him . . . I should have added above that at no time did
Stuart accomplish his most hellish purpose without the utmost resistance on my part.159
  
Before the confession was read to the jury, counsel for the parties argued over whether it was
admissible, given that (as counsel claimed), it had been extorted from her.160   Moreover, the language
that she used – utmost resistance – was the standard for determining whether a rape had occurred; her
reference to that standard also vitiates against the confession because it suggests her innocence and
161  Susan Sterett pointed out this connection to me.  E-mail, 8/18/99.  See Michelle J.
Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 963; Susan Estrich, Rape, 
95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1123 n.110, 1124-32 (1986).  Or, as another rape earlier in the century was
described, “‘Sarah struggled and cried out aloud to the last; but alarmed, almost fainting. . . she was at
length overpowered.”   HALTTUNEN , MURDER MOST FOUL, supra note __, at 180.
162  E.g., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1865, at 3; id. at  4.
163  See supra nn. __ (discussion of feminine illness).
164  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1865, at 2.
165  NOEL, supra note __, at 72-74, 78-79.
166  Id. at 47.
47
Stuart’s criminal guilt.161  By drawing on a stock story of rape, she was appealing for jury sympathy,
and emphasizing her very feminine weakness in the face of male sexual passion; even if the jury found
the confession credible, the jury might still be very sympathetic to her plight. 
Mary Strong’s lawyer argued repeatedly that she only signed the confession while “suffering
from the effects of miscarriage,”162 a clear reference not only  to her womanly and maternal character,
but also to the illness and corresponding weakness associated with women.163  Her lawyers also argued
that the loss of a child is “the most terrible ordeal a woman can go through.”164  This very public
mention of miscarriage built on the apparent feminine and delicate sensibilities of Mrs. Strong, and used
a gendered image as a defense.  The appeal to gender norms drew upon deeply held cultural beliefs.
The men defended their actions, similarly claiming conspiracy or only minor breaches of the
marital obligation.  John Noel suggested that there was a plot against him to procure a divorce for his
wife; one of his trusted friends allegedly stole important letters from his pocket.165  Dr. Noel also
defended himself by suggesting that the divorce suit was actually his mother-in-law’s idea.166   As the
167  Id. at 8, 77.
168  Id. at APPENDIX.
169  See Strong, supra note __, at 54-5.  George Templeton Strong labels Mary Strong
“[n]oble in her penitence and contrition, till her own people had moulded her into wickedness deeper
than sexual sin–into renunciation of penitence, and therefore hostility and hate toward the husband she
had wronged.”  Id. at 54.
170  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1865, at 4.
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defendant, however, the cost – financial and emotion – of settling might have been overwhelming.  He
also claimed that he had once been in a hotel room with a “French girl. . . During this time I took off her
boots.  This led to other liberties, which led to the act of intercourse, commenced but never finished. 
The girl tempted me in every possible way, so that at first I yielded but remembering my duty to my
wife, I left her. . . “167 His defense was that, although he might have been mightily tempted to stray, he
did not consummate the act of adultery, and thus was not guilty. He provided a 13-page Appendix to
the record of the divorce trial in order to re-present his version of the facts underlying the divorce
suit.168
Conspiracy was also a theme in the Strong divorce case, where the wife’s brother and father
were allegedly responsible for Mrs. Strong’s refusal to settle the divorce.169  Mr. Strong’s counsel
explained that the Stevens family: “had a cosmogony of their own.  They firmly believe that when God
made the world, he first made the Stevens family, then angels, and then men. . . . To save this imaginary
honor of the Stevens family, they would let the whole world be ruined. . .. [They want jury members to]
pay consideration for their high position.”170  In addition, he alleged that the family of Mrs. Strong had
171  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1865, at 2.  In repeating what had happened in the courtroom, the
New York Times reported that a juror testified that one of the dissenting jurors had been seen in the
company of a detective employed by the defendant.  Charges of Bribery, supra note __.   The jury
divided on the credibility of Mary Smith and Mrs. Walsh on the adultery between Mr. Strong and Mrs.
Potter.  Id.; see also History of the Jury-Box Scenes and Incidents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 4, 1866, at 4.
172  For contemporary discussion of female agency, see Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in
the Master’s Clothes, 109 Yale L.J. 745, 760 (2000) (book review); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy, Yale L. J. ---- 7, 9 (1989); cf.,. Minow, Forming Underneath, supra note
__.
173    Siegel, Rule of Love, supra n. __; Why Equal Protection, supra n. 44. 
174  See Ritter v. Ritter, 5 Blackf. 81 (Ind. 1839); Motley v. Motley, 31 Maine 490 (1850).
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tried “to obtain verdicts of juries by lavishing money upon corrupt witnesses.”171  The conspiracy theory
depended on male actors controlling their female relative; she herself had little agency and autonomy.172 
D. Marital Privacy
While the doctrine of marital privacy grew ever stronger during the nineteenth century,173 it
clearly dissolved at divorce, where courts felt free --even compelled -- to examine the nature of the
marriage.  Courts viewed the end of marriage as a very public issue.  Termination of marriage must,
courts and legislatures reiterated, be consistent with domestic harmony and public morals.174  The
public nature of divorce served as a marker of the end of marital privacy; indeed, it served as one
method of defining that privacy.  The reasons for divorce -- fault-based as well as discretionary -- all
required inquiry into the nature of the marriage.  Even the collusive divorces allowed a window into a
marriage, where a man was willing to be caught with another woman, and a wife willing to condone this. 
The courts showed an absolute willingness to investigate what was happening in the marriage,
175  For example, Mrs. Strong allegedly urged her husband to “go to bed with her” after her
confession; instead, the servants prepared her a separate bed, and “he has never since been with her.” 
N.Y. TIMES 11/25/165 at 2.
176  Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1865, at 2.
177  Inskeep v. Inskeep, 5 Iowa Rep. 204, 212 (1854).
178  In contemporary cases, we learn about the nature of the marriage in the parts of the
decisions dealing with custody and financial distribution, rather than in the grounds for granting the
divorce.  Thus, the curtain of marital privacy so wished for by no-fault advocates shields only one part
of the divorce process.
179  See supra note __, at 218.
50
and there is very little indication of any modesty on the part of the judges.  In Strong, there was
enormous discussion of the sleeping arrangements of the parties, the procuring of a miscarriage, and the
anatomy of a woman.175  Indeed, it was the New York Times which explained that much of the medical
testimony was “not of a character for our columns.”176  In an Iowa divorce cases, the statute required
that the reasons for granting an incompatibility divorce be made “fully apparent to the court.”177  The
court repeatedly emphasized its responsibility to become fully aware of all relevant facts.  Some of the
facts which justified the divorce, centering on the husband’s alleged adultery, are set out in the opinion. 
We learn that the husband owned a large farm, that he had a tenant, that the laborers boarded with the
tenant, that he prepared food for the tenant’s wife when she was sick, and that he boarded with the
tenant, rather than remaining in his house with his wife.178   The only reason we allegedly do not learn
more about the marriage is the length of the opinion,179 rather than the reluctance of the court to publish
further details of the marriage.  Privacy protected the ongoing marriage, not the dissolving marriage.
Courts seemed desperately afraid of collusion, of allowing the husband and wife to plan the
180  See, e.g., Henry Belden v. Wm. R. Munger, 5 Minn. Rep. 211 (1861)(it is contrary to
public policy for parties, or their proxies, to enter into agreement facilitating divorce).  Indeed, divorce
settlement agreements remained suspect until the middle of the twentieth century.  See Sally Burnett
Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on
Contractual Freedom,   132 U. PA . L. REV. 1399, 1400-01 (1984);  Divorce and the Third Party:
Spousal Support, Private Agreements and the State, 59 N.C.L. REV. 819, 827-29 (1981).
181  “Testimony whereon to obtain a divorce for adultery, should be full and explicit, and the
proceedings ought to show that the suit is not got up by collusion.”  Smith v. Smith, supra note __, at
n.1.
182  At least when there are no children.  See sources cited in DiFonzo, Customized Marriage,
supra note __, at 883-884; Carl  R.  Schneider,  Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law,   83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1833-42 (1985).
183  Beardsley, supra note __, at 71.
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divorce together.  Courts denied divorce if they suspected cooperation between the parties.180  This is
one reason for the necessity of full disclosure and exploration of the actual fault.181  I think the fear of
collusion stemmed from concern over a fraud on society because of the community’s interest in
marriage.  Collusion seems bizarre to modern sensibilities; where both parties no longer want to be
married to each other, we have little moral problem in allowing them to divorce.182  Similarly, the
doctrine of recrimination, pursuant to which divorce would be refused upon a finding that both parties
transgressed marital boundaries, seems strange today; even Mr. Beardsley’s counsel complained, that if
“Mr. Beardsley had committed adultery, although is wife were twice ten thousand times the wanton that
she is, they would, to use a vulgar expression, have to go it ‘nip and tuck’ during the rest of their
lives.”183    
If, however, marriage is a public status, more than a contract between the two individuals, then
an agreement to dissolve the “civil contract” of marriage ignored the rights of the third party to that
184  See Griffin v. Griffin, N.Y. PRACTICE REPORTS 183, 186-87 (1862)(“The right to a
divorce depends not upon the breach of the contract of marriage, but upon provisions of statute law.  . .
it is on the ground of public policy, or the general good, that all our statute regulations in regard to
divorces are founded.  And it is because the party has violated a duty, or obligation imposed by law. . .
that a decree of divorce is granted”).
185  BEARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 77.
186  Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Edw. Ch. 439 (1832).
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contract, the state (or the community).   Nineteenth century judges viewed marriage as something
different from a contract between the parties, but as something regulated for the public good.184  As
counsel argued in closing arguments in Beardsley v. Beardsley, the fault charges are “serious, affecting
[the parties’] welfare and the welfare of their offspring, and, I may add, vitally affecting the best
interests of society.”185 
The law required complete innocence on the part of the spouse receiving divorce: no fault and
no forgiveness of fault.  Forgiveness of fault, or condonation, was frequently alleged based on the
spouses continuing to live together after the adulterous acts.  There appears to have been a double
standard, however, based on women’s subordinate role within marriage, such that a woman’s
condonation could be treated differently from her husband’s.  As the Vice-Chancellor explained in
1832: 
Another principle appears to be equally well established, namely, that the effect of cohabitation
as a condonation is less binding on the wife that it is on the husband: because . . . she may entertain
better hopes of the recovery and reform of her husband, her honor is less injured and is more easily
healed; and so far from being improper that she should for a time show a patient forbearance, it is
commendable in her to exercise it, with a view to reclaim him: which would not be tolerated in the
husband where the wife should happen to be the delinquent party.  Besides, she may find a difficulty
either in quitting his house or withdrawing from his bed.186
This doctrine contains two messages about the appropriate behaviour of a wife.  First, a wife can
187  KAREN HALTTUNEN , CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED LADIES: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-
CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA , 1830-1870 (1982); Korobkin, supra note __, at 23-24.  Professor
Lawrence Friedman notes that “confidence crimes and swindling” were certainly increasing during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Lawrence Friedman, Crimes of Mobility, 43 STAN. L. REV.
437, 453 (1991).
188  HALTTUNEN , CONFIDENCE MEN, supra note __, at xv-xvi.
189  Id. at 51.
190  Friedman, supra note __, at 639.
191  See also Korobkin, supra note __, at 28.
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reclaim her husband from his fault, and should be rewarded for attempting to do so; and second, it
contains a recognition of the difficulty of women separating from their marital households.  It also
reaffirms the double sexual standard.  Women’s subordination, otherwise disadvantageous, becomes,
as it did in many of the divorce trials, a source of advantage.
This notion of innocence, of freedom from fraud or collusion, has deep resonances with
nineteenth century culture and law.  There was a deep-seated fear in nineteenth-century America of the
confidence man, the swindler, who was not what he appeared to be.187   Especially given the multiple
opportunities for pretense and false re-creation in a society that espoused an ethic of the self-made
man, sincerity was a highly treasured commodity.188  As individuals became more mobile, re-
establishing themselves in new communities, the possibilities of fraud were increasingly available. 
Indeed, a “cult of sincerity” developed to counteract the fear of hypocrisy,189 and social anxiety over
the development of false identities lead to a feeling that crimes such as bigamy and swindling were
profoundly threatening.190  The clash of conflicting stories in court may have served to air fully issues
surrounding fraud, hypocrisy, and collusion191 so that the jury could choose which, if either, spouse,
192  TRIAL OF THE SUIT OF AUGUSTA ROONEY VS. SAMUEL B. ROONEY FOR A DIVORCE 8
(1858).  The lawyer charged that the husband was able to do this with “a large share of impudence.” 
Id.
193  Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of
the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 8 (1986).
194  Id. at 71, 73.
195  See, e.g., Griswold, supra note __, at 16.  
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was innocent.  The lawyer in one case even went so far as to suggest explicitly that the defendant
husband had “pass[ed] himself off among honest people as a man of sincerity and piety,”192 thereby
calling on this fear of confidence men.
Parallels to the cultural anxiety about collusion and fraud can be found in other substantive areas
of law.  For example, in its original form, bankruptcy law was essentially criminal, without any discharge
of the debtor’s debts.193  During the nineteenth century debates over various aspects of bankruptcy
law, commentators expressed concern over the “rogue” and collusive debtor who manipulated the laws
to their own advantage.194   Such guilty debtors should not be protected by the bankruptcy laws.  This
basic concern over fraud, collusion, and false appearance reflected cultural tensions over the sincerity of
the merchant’s character.
IV.  NARRATIVES OF FAULT , STORIES OF GENDER 
The images of men and women that develop from these divorce records do not suggest a
“liberalizing”195 of gendered expectations in society nor an egalitarianism in marriage.  Instead, they
suggest the seemingly appropriate roles to be expected in marriage.  Women were supposed to be pure
196  See generally Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note __. 
197  See WRIGHT, supra note __, at 305-06 (advocating a change in perspective to explore the
complexity of familial changes in the nineteenth century).
198  For contemporary discussion of the subordinating nature of marriage, see Ann Shalleck,
Foundational Myths and the Reality of Dependence: The Rules of Marriage, 8 AM . U.J. GENDER
SOC. POLICY. & L. 197, 202 (2000).
199  See, e.g., Wriggins, supra note __, at 281.
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and virtuous and maternal; when they were not, they were punished.  Men were supposed to keep their
appetites in check (or at least unknown to their wives), and were supposed to provide for their families. 
If they strayed too far, or too obviously, then they were subject to public exposure.  What changed was
women’s ability to expect this behaviour from their
husbands.  Thus, women gained some “power,” but it was a very circumscribed and complex power.196 
Men were still expected to exercise control over the household, and even to control their wives. 
Changing our perspective, looking “down” from equality rather than “up” from inequality,197 nineteenth
century marriage rhetoric continued to reinforce patriarchy and hierarchy.  
A.  Separate Spheres.  
The roles of men and women had changed somewhat from earlier periods of United States
history, but marriage continued as a hierarchical, subordinating institution with strictly confined, and
defined, roles.198   Men were required to support their wives, but wives were not similarly required to
do so; wives were required to provide companionship and services, but husbands were not legally
obligated to do so.199
Women’s separate sphere was never as significant as men’s.  Historian Jeanne Boydston traces
200    See JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE
IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 17-18 (1990).   
201 See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note __,  at 3-4; SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL
CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 29-33 (1996); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS
CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985); Janet L. Dolgin, Transforming
Childhood: Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 1113, 1149 (1997).
202  Women were not entitled to compensation for their household work performed for their
family.  See BOYDSTON, supra note __; JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARENTS TO PARTNERS: THE SECOND
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LA W  89 (2000);VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 41-
61 (1997); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994). 
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the changing perception of housework from valuable labor that provided an economic contribution to
the household to domestic labor that did not constitute work.200  Of course, even when men and
women worked together on the farm, men still retained control and dealt with the
outside world; nonetheless, women’s contributions to the household and the farms were valued because
that was where work occurred.  As men left the household for “outside” work, work within the
household, be it child care or laundry or cooking, began to be perceived differently because it was
performed for the family, rather than for a market employer.  This transition occurred as American
culture developed new concepts of childhood; children were no longer means of production, but were
valued and treasured innocents.201  The mother’s role became increasingly important, but separate from
the waged labor world and much less “valuable” than the work in that world.202   
The man’s role as breadwinner reinforced his responsibility to maintain his wife and children in
the domestic sphere.  The man was entitled to his own wages, but also remained entitled to the
203  See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE,
AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 161 (1998); Siegel, Home as Work, supra
note __.  
204  See STANLEY, supra note __, at 140, 161.
205  STANLEY, supra note __, at 165; see generally Elizabeth Clark, Matrimonial Bonds:
Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth-Century America, 8 LAW AND HIST. REV. 25 (1990).
206  Clark, Matrimonial Bonds, supra note __.  The 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration proclaimed
that man “has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes, and in case of
separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the
happiness of women.”  ELIZABETH CADY STANTON ET AL., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 71
(1881).  Subsequent conventions, however, failed to enact resolutions relating to divorce. 
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domestic labor of his wife.203  This entitlement was so central that it was part of the definition of a “free”
man.204  Within his home, man continued to hold the title of “master.”205  Indeed, throughout her life,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton discussed the importance of divorce, and attempted to introduce resolutions at
Woman’s Rights Conventions; Stanton compared the status of women in marriage to the status of
blacks under slavery, using the analogy to argue that women needed a right to autonomy.206
The legal system’s somewhat dismissive treatment of women’s confessions to adultery similarly
emphasizes the weakness of women in marriage.  Women were susceptible to their husbands’ control
even of their words, and their very confessions were suspect because of their willingness to comply with
their husband’s authority.
B.  Trial Roles
There is an ongoing scholarly debate over the role of trials and trial narratives in United States
207  See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors/Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. __
(forthcoming 2001); Richard Delgado, “Making Pets: Social Workers, “Problem Groups,” and the
Role of the SPCA–Getting a Little More Precise about Racialized Narratives, 77 TEXAS L. REV.
1571 (1999); Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: “Race-Conscious” Ethics in Criminal
Defense, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1585 (1999); Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal
Meaning: Spectacular Trials, the Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal Responsibility, 33
LA W  & SOCY. REV. 393 (1999).
Trials can be seen as: 1) formal legal processes; 2) courtroom drama; or 3) contests between
conflicting narratives.  Martha Merrill Umphrey, Comments at Panel on Trials on Trial, Law, Culture &
Humanities Conference (March 10, 2001).  In this article, as discussed infra, I am examining the trials
as simultaneously drama and contests of narratives. 
208  Lawrence Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1595
(1989); see also Hartog, Abigail Bailey’s Coverture, supra note __, at 68.  Commenting specifically
on divorce complaints, Professor Friedman states that they offer useful information “about behaviors
that count as cruelty or unfairness within marriage; they indicate what stories might impress a court as
grounds for dissolving a loveless marriage.”  Friedman, supra (citing Robert Griswold, Family and
Divorce in California, 1850-1890, and Elaine Tyler May, Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in
Post-Victorian American (1980)).  I think these insights are critical to a study of the stories told at
divorce trials for what they reveal about behaviours expected during marriage; in addition, these stories
also reveal information about gendered behaviours expected throughout the culture. 
209  See GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE, supra note __, at 14 (judges “oversaw the
public ceremony that helped establish and maintain cultural boundaries by offering community members
a chance to express opposition to the offense, to bear witness against the offender, to reaffirm the
bonds of cultural solidarity, and to sharpen the authority of the violated norm”).
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law and culture.207  This article focuses on one aspect of this debate: do these narratives reinforce
dominant cultural expectations or do they (and should they) challenge these same ideals?   Professor
Lawrence Friedman asserts that, because each trial is a “narrative competition” between the stories told
by the two sides, “arguments presented in trials are often important clues to what stories count as good,
or true, or compelling stories, within a particular culture.”208   Trials are thus “boundary-maintaining”
devices between what is appropriate and inappropriate within the community.209  They serve, in some
210  GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE, supra note __, at 16.
211  Brian Bix, Comments, 8/26/99.
212  BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note __, at 144, 151-52.  Professor Nancy
Cott observed that news about divorce petitions may have encouraged others to seek divorce as well. 
Nancy Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-century Massachusetts,
33 WM .& MARY Q. 586, 593 (1986).
213  See Melissa G. Ganz, Wicked Women and Veiled Ladies: Gendered Narratives of the
McFarland-Richardson Tragedy, 9 YALE J. L. & FEM . 255, 262-63 (1997).  
214  See Cott, supra note __; see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM , POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1996)(arguing for the value of narratives in shaping an integrated,
ethical life and expanding public discourse). 
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sense, as “moral theater,”210 or at least as “propaganda about expectations.”211  
By contrast, Professor Norma Basch, who has studied divorce trial popular pamphlets, believes
that popularized trials allowed men and women to understand and demystify divorce, and provided
complex images of marriage rather than simplistic pictures of a true marriage.212    Melissa Ganz
“questions the claim that popular trials of the nineteenth century reinforced cultural ‘norms’ and
contained cultural threats”, and argues that “defense lawyers [actually] told stories that were profoundly
subversive and . . .called into question more ideals than [they] reaffirmed.”213  On this view, the stories
told in trials were, to some extent, stories of challenge and resistance to dominant norms; by
popularizing the possibility of divorce, the stories served to make divorce more accessible and realistic,
and to challenge the very norms that were contested.214  The pervasiveness of these stories thereby
illustrates the means for subverting the larger cultural narratives of marriage and divorce.
Instead, I believe the trials and the stories told within those trials served a different purpose.  As
Professors Friedman and Griswold explain, the trials told stories of gender and marriage, of men and
215  Of course, there was no one uniform, easily identified set of marital expectations that each
marriage was required to respect.  See Dubler, Wifely Behaviour, supra note __ (manuscript at p. 20). 
Nonetheless, the general contours of expected behaviour were discernible.
216  See supra nn. __ (discussing the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention resolution on divorce).
217  For a contemporary perspective advocating that lawyers should contest dominant norms
through counternarratives at trial, see Alfieri, supra note __; Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial
Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51
STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized
Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157
(1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV.
809 (2000); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1293 (1998).
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women who had seemingly challenged cultural expectations and of men and women who had attempted
to comply with those expectations; they articulated appropriate forms of behaviour and also
demonstrated the consequences of inappropriate behaviour.  The images themselves were not
contested within the trial, and the terrain remained conformance with, or deviance from, these images. 
The jurors decided which spouses had violated norms, and, in doing so, certainly helped to articulate
and refine appropriate roles.215    
Rarely – if at all –  did divorce lawyers represent a client and proclaim, “My client is a Free
Lover, and this justifies her behaviour.”  Nor did they say, “My client does not want to support his
family.”  That is, they did not contest the images, nor seek to subvert them; they merely contested
whether their clients had transgressed the boundaries of these images and accused the opposing spouse
of the transgressions.  The stories in court thus did not reflect the liberation language of the woman’s
movement,216 a discourse which was beginning to develop even as lawyers framed conventional
gendered stories that conformed to the jurors’ expectations of marital roles.217
218  See BASCH, at 176 (“In depicting scenes of heterosexual intimacy outside the boundaries of
marriage, they were helping to detach sexuality from the realm of procreation”). 
219  Cf.  DANIEL COHEN, PILLARS OF SALT , MONUMENTS OF GRACE: NEW ENGLAND CRIME
LITERATURE AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 1674-1860 (1993)(arguing that
stories of criminals grew more popular because of the need to understand the developing criminal
underworld); HALTTUNEN , MURDER MOST FOUL, supra note __, at 160 (casually mentioning “the
emerging norms of companionate marriage, ‘true womanhood,’ and loving child nurture”).
220  See WILLIAM O’NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 6-7 (1967); CARL N.
DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT
165-176 (1980).  Professor Degler even suggests that “divorce allowed an endless pursuit of the
perfect marriage by freeing the individual to consider his or her own needs and expectations.”  Id. at
174.  
Professor Carol Weisbrod argues that the development of romantic love within marriage should
61
Although the trials did depict violations of marriage norms,218 they also reinforced dominant
cultural images of marriage and of men and women.  The adulterers – either male or female – were not
celebrated, and were defended not as adulterers but as husbands and wives who had, in fact, not
violated their marriage vows.  Their transgressions, while made public, were also publicly denied.  Both
the plaintiffs and defendants told stories of deviance and conformance, and argued over which party
had conformed and which party had deviated from conventional expectations.  The popularity of the
divorce trial accounts may simply have resulted from the need to understand the somewhat changing
expectations resulting from the development of a companionate, hierarchical marriage model, as
opposed to a hierarchical marriage model.219  They served to publicize the cultural canon to which
marriages were required to conform, rather than to condone deviance from that canon.  The deviant
spouses were punished, not praised, and thus provided cautionary tales.  
While some scholars have suggested that the increasing numbers of divorces reflected a need to
“let off steam” as spouses developed higher expectations of marriage,220 the actual causes of the
be associated with the end of the nineteenth century; prior to that time, divorce was available only in
“acute” situations.  Carol Weisbrod, Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and Questions on Law
and Narrative, 1991 B.Y.U.L. REV. 143, 172-73.
221  See FRIEDMAN, supra note __, at 501 (“paradox of the moral attack on divorce: the
immorality of divorce depends on the sacredness of marriage; but the sacredness of marriage increased
the demand for divorce”).
222  As Danaya Wright shows in the context of child custody litigation, there was no linear
progression towards egalitarianism in marriage during the nineteenth century.  Danaya Wright,
Constructing Patriarchy: The Development of  Interspousal Custody Law in England, 17 LA W  &
HIST. REV. 247 (1999).
223  See DEGLER, supra note __, at 165-166.  Professor Degler points out that the ratio of
marriages dissolved to the total number of marriages was higher in 1860 than in 1950; the death of a
spouse constituted over 95% of the reasons for dissolution of a marriage in 1860, while it constituted
only 66% of the reasons for dissolution in 1950.  Degler at 173.  As individual’s life-span increased, so
too did the divorce rate.  Id.
224  See Id. at 168.
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divorce increase are far more complex.  I have not discovered the reasons for the increasing demand
for divorce – whether it was the image of companionate marriage,221 more egalitarianism in marriage,222
or more publicity for the divorces that were recurring, or a breakdown in community norms that
provided the glue for marriage.  Dissatisfaction with marriage was not a new occurrence, unique to the
mid-nineteenth century, as shown by the historically large numbers of desertions and informal and
formal separations;223 moreover, a lower life expectancy also meant that marriages lasted for a shorter
period of time.  The increase in divorce, and the number of divorces granted to women, might seem to
support a claim for women’s greater autonomy;224 instead, the fact that women may have initiated the
actions more frequently than men shows their need not to be found at fault, their recognition of the
confining nature of women’s role such that transgression was punished by denial of property and child
225  See DEGLER, supra note __, at 172; CHUSED, MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY ACTS;
Siegel, supra note __.
226  NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD  5-9, 197-201 (1982).
227  For a discussion of women’s “political” activities in improving society, see Martha Minow,
“Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:” Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 819, 877 (1985); see generally ANNE FIROR SCOTT, NATURAL ALLIES: WOMEN’S
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993); Carle, supra note __.  Robert Griswold discusses
how changes in women’s domestic roles increased women’s status.  GRISWOLD, supra note __, at 13-
16.
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custody.  On the other hand, by the end of the century, women’s economic opportunities were
increasing, and this does account for some amount of the increase.225  That is, women were financially
able to support themselves if they could extricate themselves from marriages, and consequently, were
not economically forced to stay in their marriages.  In fact, one of the atypical factors in the divorce
trials discussed in this article is the class and economic resources of the women.  These were often
women who could afford to be divorced.  
Thus, what these cases show is that although there was certainly some “liberalizing” of roles,
women were still confined to the limited sphere of home and family and fidelity and purity.  The
domestic sphere became increasingly important during late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
America, and so did women’s role within it.  “The doctrine of woman’s sphere opened to women
(reserved for them) the avenues of domestic influence, religious morality, and child nurture.”226 Even as
they expanded their interests outside of the home, they were expected to maintain a focus on
appropriately womanly pursuits.227  In their voluntary work outside of the home, women were
constrained by, and constrained themselves through, the ideology of domesticity.  Their expertise in
228  Minow, supra note __, at 880.
229  See Susan Sterett, Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness & Dependence: Public Pensions
in the 1860s-1920s, 75 DEN. U.L. REV. 1181, 1211 (1998)(“The late-nineteenth century was a time in
which sexual identities were becoming less flexible and more obviously marked”).  Women who were
socioeconomically privileged were somewhat more able to live outside of these roles.  See Carle, supra
note __; Sterett, supra. 
230  The Married Women’s Property Acts were ambiguous, at best.  See Richard Chused,
Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1414 (1983)(“The significant
features of the [Married Women’s Property Acts] did not reject married women’s separate domestic
sphere, but recognized the importance of women as caretakers of children and family resources”);
History’s Double Edge: A Comment on Modernization of Marital Status Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 2213
(1994); Nancy Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 104
AM . HIST. REV. 1440, 1451-54, 1457 (1998); Siegel, Home as Work, supra note __; Siegel,
Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 104; Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and
Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM . HIST. 471 (1988);
Sterrett, supra note__,  at 1198-1202.  Professor Cott discusses an 1855 statute that allowed a male
American citizen to confer citizenship on the woman that he married, but made no such allowance for a
female American citizen; she explains that the law “underlined customary male headship of the married
couple as a civic and political norm.”  Cott, supra, at 1456.
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these areas was based on their domestic roles.228 The gendered roles within marriage remained quite
rigid,229 and the availability of divorce served to reinforce this rigidity.  Within the confines of a fault
regime and of fixed gender roles both within and outside of marriage, divorce was not easy. 
The confining effects of domesticity for both men and women served to reinforce the
patriarchal nature of marriage.  Even though women were entitled to expectations of companionship
and fidelity from their husbands, it was still the woman who was economically dependent during
marriage and at divorce; for example, property, labor, and pension laws in the surrounding culture
reinforced women’s subordinate and dependent status in marriage.230  The cost to any individual
woman of demanding that her husband comply with these manly ideals remained high, even if she were
able to escape her marriage.  Men remained subject to comparatively few constraints on their
231 See generally, MARILYN YALOM , A HISTORY OF THE WIFE (2001).
232  See, e.g., Siegel, Home as Work,  supra note __, at 1120-22.
233  See GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE, supra note__, at 5.
234  In discussing what to expect from a history of marriage, Professor Hartog suggests:
We would want to know how a legal order worked that presumed that marriage was,
definitionally, but perhaps only theoretically, “for life.” . . .  How did their law–meaning how did
the lawyers, judges, litigants, and other legal actors of the time, the men with legal power and
legal responsibility in the society, as well as the legal supplicants–deal with marital conflict, with
hatred, with incompatibility, with cruelty, with settled aversions?
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA  (2000). 
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behavior; and their transgressions were punished more lightly than were women’s.231  A woman could
initiate a divorce when she was able to become economically independent of a husband, and/or when
she could avoid a finding of fault, a finding which could preclude her from receiving support or
property from her spouse.  And, given women’s low wages,232 the possibility of economic
independence was slight unless women became dependent on their families or another man.  When
women had been deserted and were, consequently, no longer economically dependent, then they
might be more likely to seek a divorce; a spouse’s adultery, however, might be an insufficient
justification for becoming economically independent of a husband.233
The images that emerge from the trials are of unhappy marriages, of men and women who
failed in their marital undertakings, and as such, they seem more cautionary than incendiary.  The
divorce trials, as history, show how the law imagined the obligations of marriage and of husbands and
wives, and then handled alleged breaches of those obligations.234  While the popularity of these trials
235  See Cott, supra note __; BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note 19; cf., Susan
Sterrett, Serving the State: Constitutionalism and Social Spending, 1860s-1920s, 22 LA W  & SOC.
INQ. 311, 313 (1997)(“Legal discourse, including contests over its meaning among lawyers and
commentators, is partially constitutive of a polity”).  
236  Cf. HALTTUNEN , MURDER MOST FOUL, supra note __ (suggesting that the nineteenth
century Gothic imagery of murderers as monsters replaced an earlier understanding of murderers as
“common sinners”, an understanding that is returning today).
237  See Naomi Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475 (1993); Sarat, supra note __;
Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal Meaning, supra note __.
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may have publicized the availability of divorce,235 they also established the boundaries of behaviour
sufficient to obtain a divorce.  Husband and wives may both have been able to “see” themselves and
their marriages in the stories of divorce, or they may have viewed the divorcing spouses as evil
beings.236   Lawyers certainly tried to depict their clients as ordinary creatures, and the other spouse as
inhuman monsters.  Nonetheless, whether members of the public (or jurors) identified with either the
innocent or guilty spouse, or saw them as monsters, they also saw the consequences of failure to
conform.      
Ultimately, the divorce trials contained the stories of the individual litigants as well as the stories
of marriage and of men and women.  The rhetoric deployed in these divorce trials provides glimpses of
the marriages themselves.  The stylized story forms nonetheless cannot mask completely how
husbands and wives lived, or did not live, with each other.   That these stories were, at many times,
formulaic, simply reveals the expectations of the male and female litigants rather than the “truth” of any
litigant’s particular story.  For a story to become legally cognizable, it must be framed so that it
accords with existing legal practices.  But, of course, when the events occur, they do not accord with
legal structures.237   
238  Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories, CRITICAL INQUIRY
213 (Autumn 1980).
239  See Hayden White, The Narrativization of Real Events, 7 CRITICAL INQUIRY 793, 797
(1981); Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1275, 1313 (1999).
240  See HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM  24 (1987)(“this value attached to
narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the
coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary”); but see
ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 211-216 (2d ed.
1984)(discussing the coherence of an individual’s life narrative)/
241  Richard Chused states: “the middle and upper class’ tolerance for family deviance
decreased sharply between 1865 and 1900 in both the north and the south.”  COMMENTS FOR
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR LEGAL HISTORY 7 (Oct. 22, 1999).
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Narratologists recognize that the “basic story” will vary depending on who is doing the
retelling, that it is difficult to determine the actual origins of the basic story,238 but the basic story
generally accords with larger cultural themes.  These plot structures show how various events are
translated, by the culture, into moral terms.239 Events may appear random until they are organized into
a coherent structure.240  The basic stories in these divorce cases thus provide insight into general
cultural attitudes towards men and women and the role of marriage.  The basic story reveals social
expectations of husbands and wives, and the marriage norm.  Even as the marriage norm changed, as
women’s roles within the household were transformed together with men’s roles outside of the
household, the basic story of marriage remained hierarchical and confining.  The roles acceptable for
both men and women, and the role of marriage itself,  were constraining.241  Even when men and
women were not formally married, the law engaged in many fictions to make their relationships
242  See HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA , supra note __, at 254-56(discussing the
presumption of the validity of a second marriage); Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note __ (discussing
the importance of acting married to receiving the legal status of marriage).
243  See Hartog, supra note __, at 310 (“I reject the premise of law as a monotonoal imposiion
of domination . . . There was domination aplenty but also opportunity, critique, renewal through law,
and contradiction and indeterminacy.”).
244  MacComb, supra note __, at 304.
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conform to the dominant ideal.242  The efforts of judges and litigants to impose marriage on these
relationships shows not just an attempt to confine dependency, but also an attempt to define roles, to
assimilate these relationships to the dominant model of men’s and women’s lives.  There were, of
course, counterstories, trials in which at-fault women received property; the existence of these cases
illustrates that the law did not speak in one coercive voice.243
Throughout the nineteenth century, women remained confined by the marriage plot.  Marriage
established their roles; consequently, leaving marriage remained an ambiguous act of liberation.
“Divorcees were society’s ‘unmarried married’ women, doubly defined by the matrimonial institution
rather than liberated from it.”244  The existence of divorce did not dilute the power of marriage as a
regulatory institution.  
While the very proliferation of divorce cases can be seen as a disintegration of the traditional
familial norms, I see these cases, instead, as forcing cultural norms to do their work, to reinforce roles. 
As expectations of marriage changed, as men moved out of house-based labor, and women were
defined by household labor, men and women were laying claim to compliance with these newly
developing images.  Women were becoming more active within their communities, leaving the hearth –
245  E.g., MINOW , supra note __; CAROLYN LAWES , WOMEN AND REFORM IN A NEW
ENGLAND COMMUNITY, 1815-1860 3-4 (2000)
246  See BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE, supra note __.
247  See LYSTRA, supra note __, at 210 (between 1830-1870, “the idea that a voluntary union
might be voluntarily undone was inhibited by the still powerful sense of the marital relationship as a set
of duties externally imposed upon husband and wife”).
248  See, e.g., HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA , supra note __, at 105-06; Frances
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
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but only to promote moral purity outside the home.245  Similarly, women (and their lawyers) promoted
moral purity and domestic feminism through the divorce cases, claiming the domestic images of
women, and condemning men for their failure to comply with these images.  The changing expectations
of marriage, and the changing roles of women came together to enshrine these images.  Lawyers for
the men similarly claimed that the women had transgressed their domestic roles, while the men had
complied with their expectations.  The potential titillation caused by images of women tempting men246
was more than matched by the judgment – legal and social – that these women received for their
transgressions.  Although the model of companionate marriage developed as the dominant image for
middle and upper-class families, the roles in marriage remained primarily unchanged.247    
The divorce stories are reflections of women’s and men’s status in society.  Wives who
ventured too far outside their roles as moral purifiers were at fault, and no longer deserved to be
married.  While women were becoming more active and activist, their activities continued to be
circumscribed.  Indeed, the stories that they told, and their defenses against contrary stories,
repeatedly emphasized their own purity.  While they might be leaving the home for divorce court (even
though they could not be witnesses, in most cases)248, they were leaving for a justifiable cause. 
1497, 1531 (1983); Milton Regan, Spousal Privilege and the Meaning of Marriage, 81 VA . L. REV.
2045 (1995).
249  In one contemporary study of the changing reasons for women’s divorce, the researchers
found that, prior to no-fault divorce, women left marriages because of their husband’s faults, such as
desertion or alcoholism; 20 years after the institution of no-fault – when women did not fear that a
finding of fault would lead to even greater financial and custodial consequences -- women initiated
divorce because of a loss of emotional intimacy.  June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the
Family in Terms of Community, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 359, 403 n. 29 (citing 1992 study).  While I am
extremely hesitant to project retroactively, I nonetheless think these data – and those from other studies
– show that it is not the development of companionate marriage per se that leads to divorce.  Rather, it
is other changes in women’s and men’s roles, such as women’s increasing financial independence, as
well as other cultural attitudes and laws, such as changes in the concepts of morality in family law, that
lead to divorce.
   
250ELIZABETH CADY STANTON ET AL., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 71 (1881).
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Women who participated in divorce cases were defending their honor and their purity and their
womanliness, not their autonomy nor even their rights to emotional intimacy in marriage.249  
Nonetheless, although many of these divorce trials occurred at the same time as widespread
debate on the morality of divorce, the stories in court simply did not reflect the liberation language of
the woman’s movement.  The 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration proclaimed that man “has so framed the
laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes, and in case of separation, to whom the
guardianship of the children shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women.”250 
Subsequent conventions, however, failed to enact resolutions relating to divorce.  When divorce was
discussed, it was as a moral issue.  Elizabeth Clark explains, “Before the Civil War, feminist arguments
for divorce were not made in terms of an abstract right to individual liberty, but in more pragmatic
terms, the most fundamental being the instinct for self-preservation .. . . [they] invoked duties, rather
251  Elizabeth Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth-Century
America, 8 LA W  & HIST. REV. 25, 28 (1990).   Throughout her life, Elizabeth Cady Stanton discussed
the importance of divorce, and attempted to introduce resolutions at Woman’s Rights Conventions. 
Stanton compared the status of women in marriage to the status of blacks under slavery, using the
analogy to argue that women needed a right to autonomy.  
252  E.g. Mary A. Livermore, et al., Women’s Views of Divorce, reprinted in DIVORCE: THE
FIRST DEBATES 110, 112 (David J. Rothman and Sheila M. Rothman eds. 1987); ELEANOR FLEXNER,
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 152-53.
253  See Clark, supra note __, at 47.
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than rights.”251  After the Civil War, she argues, the rhetoric changed to emphasize women’s rights to
“personal liberty,” a stance that was controversial both within the woman’s movement as well as within
the larger society.  Indeed, many in the woman’s movement, who had successfully achieved some of
their goals, turned away from their earlier divorce reform advocacy in an effort to achieve suffrage, and
many feminists even advocated stricter divorce laws.252   Moreover, the scarcely acknowledged
problem with this perspective was that focusing solely on divorce removed it from the context of
women’s subordinate, unequal lives; a right to divorce was meaningless without some rights to
economic independence.253
  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The stories of fault implicated individual men and women for their failings: their failings as
individual spouses, and their failure to conform to the social norms of gendered behaviour.  Because
divorce was fault-based, lawyers were required to craft their stories so that their clients were
recognizably innocent and wronged while their spouses were guilty and faulty.  Although there was of
course no one norm for wifely or husbandly behaviour, there were a set of generally accepted
254  See Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note __.  In his survey of the earliest domestic relations
casebooks which were published at the end of the century, Professor Dirk Hartog found that wive’s
roles remained shaped by their obligations to their husbands; husbands were able to demand
satisfaction of those obligations with a reciprocal obligation to support their wives.  Hartog, supra note
__, at 293.
255  For suggestions that fault should, perhaps, be relevant, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse
with comments by Katharine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-
Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994). 
256  See, e.g., Wriggins, supra note __; Cahn, Moral Complexities, supra note __.  Professor
Elizabeth Scott points out that “[t]he law has embraced egalitarian gender norms, categorically
withdrawing support from hierarchical, differentiated marital roles.”  Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and
the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA . L. REV. 1901, 1905 (2000).
257  See Steven Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA . L. REV. 1971, 1975-76
(2000).  
Within the law and economics approach, there is an apparent acceptance that social norms
result from an individual’s self-interested actions, and that cultural forces cannot be
“anthropomorphized” to explain the development of norms.   See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling
Discount Rates: Law, Norms and Economic Methodology, 110 Yale L.J. 625, 680-81
72
conventions for wives and husbands for which transgression was to be punished.  Acting like a wife or
a husband did have some meaning, albeit not precise,254 so jurors were able to recognize when the
parties before them acted appropriately.  The roles for husbands and wives remained deeply gendered
and unequal throughout the nineteenth century, and the stories of fault reveal these expectations.
Under the no-fault system in contemporary law, the norms of gendered marital behaviour are
irrelevant to receiving a divorce based on incompatibility.255  A husband who does not provide for his
wife, or a woman who is sexually active outside of marriage, can still receive a divorce without
revealing any grounds. Indeed, the domestic relations law has been transformed so that there is a story
of greater equality in mutual obligations.256 
Nonetheless, cultural norms of gender257 differ from the legal norms of domestic relations law.
(2001)(book review).  Contrary to this approach, however, I believe that cultural forces – without a
particular “face” or body – influence individuals’ behaviour, and shape their choices.  See, e.g., JOAN
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: HOW WORK AND FAMILY CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2000); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1989).  Moreover, the new social norms jurisprudence
focuses on the formation of small group norms, with inadequate attention to the larger social norms that
structure those groups.  See Mitchell, supra note __, at 256-247.
258  See MAHONEY, supra note __.   Professor Nock also notes that gender norms in marriage
reinforce the appropriateness of wives as caretakers, and men as breadwinners.  Id. at 1976-77; see
Naomi Cahn, Doing Gender, __ YALE J.L. & FEM . __ (forthcoming 2001); Gendered Identities, 44
VILL. L. REV. 525 (1999).
259  See Orr v. Orr,  440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down as sex discrimination an Alabama
statute providing that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce). 
260  See WILLIAMS, supra note __; Martha Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal
for Valuing Women’s Work through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998);
Jana Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic
Justification of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced
Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation under
No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993); Amy Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is
There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA . L. REV. 509 (1998); David Kaufman, Note: The
New York Equitable Distribution Statute: An Update, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 845, 846-848 
(1987)(reporting on early assessments of New York statute mandating equitable distribution of all
assets upon divorce).  
Professor Martha Fineman eloquently argues that women’s caretaking within the family is
unrecognized and uncompensated, and that norms of equitable distribution at divorce harm women. 
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction, and Social
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The social norms of gender still encourage women to define themselves as mothers and not work (or
at least not work full-time) outside of the home,258 while divorce law no longer explicitly accounts for
gender.259  Where gendered values do appear, however, is in much more subtle ways, in the context
of child custody, alimony, and property distribution.  Women who stay home, or who are less than
fully productive workers, are still financially penalized upon divorce, perhaps  because of the very
expectation of equality.260   They are performing the traditional wifely role but are no longer protected
Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983
WIS. L. REV. 789; Child Support is Not the Answer: The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare
Reform, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER 209 (J. Thomas Oldham and Marygold Melli eds.
2000).
261  See HIRSHMAN AND LARSON, supra note __, at 26-29; RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING
OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING POWER 37 (1995); WILLIAMS, supra note
__; Rose, supra note __; Brian Bix, Engagement with Economics:  The New Hybrids of Family
Law/Law & Economics Thinking (2001)(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
262  See ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 133, 138 (2001); Cahn, Doing
Gender, supra note __. 
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by the law.  The assumption is that they have not contributed economically to the marriage, and thus
have no long-term entitlement to the human capital produced during the marriage. During the marriage,
they have frequently made a series of choices that weakens them in any further bargaining.261  These
choices within marriage are themselves the product of conflicting social norms that simultaneously
encourage gender equality and gendered dependence.   
The enforcement of gender norms at divorce has thus shifted locations from the rhetoric
surrounding divorce itself to the economic consequences of being divorced.  Innocent nineteenth
century women were entitled to receive alimony, property, and custody; innocent twentieth century
women who have complied with gender norms through caretaking and housekeeping are
disadvantaged economically upon divorce.  Judges continue to view marital property as belonging
primarily to the person who earned it, and to believe that women deserve little compensation for their
household and care work during the marriage.262  Domestic relations law has, on the one hand,
changed to recognize women’s equality, but, on the other hand, to discount caretaking work, instead
of recognizing the relationship between women’s equality and caretaking work, and adequately
263  See Nock, supra note __, at 1974; Scott, Limits of Behavioral Theories, supra note __,
at 1638-39.
264  Cf.  Martha Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of Love, 98 ETHICS
225, 253 (1988)(ascribing similar power to fictional narratives).
265  Professors Peg Brinig and Steve Crafton argue that no-fault has led to increased
opportunistic behaviour within marriage and decreased investment in marriage itself.  See Brinig and
Crafton, supra note __, at 892; but see Ira Ellman & Sharon L. Lohr, Dissolving the
Relationship Between Divorce Laws and Divorce Rates, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
341 (1998).
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accounting for wives’ household labor.  There are deeply conflicting sets of social norms that control
intimate marital roles and public social roles.263
In a system where fault is irrelevant, innocence and guilt are also irrelevant; courts follow
equitable, allegedly neutral standards that nonetheless have gendered implications.  The stories told at
divorce by lawyers, judges, and litigants continue to contain lessons about the moral expectations of
marriage, and, in turn, have some influence on the shapes of those expectations.264  The nineteenth
century trials do not reveal an overly-romantic and self-expressive view of marriage.  Rather, the trials
illustrate an inegalitarian, somewhat rigid institution.
The contemporary rhetoric of marriage, as reflected in the availability of no-fault divorce, has
become increasingly egalitarian.  The excision of fault from the law of divorce promises that marriage
no longer involves keeping track of who has failed to comply with marital obligations, with the
consequent responsibility that compliance is insufficient to guarantee either the continuation of the
marriage or adequate financial support upon divorce.265  Although the laws of divorce are commonly
seen as default rules, they structure marital dissolution, at least as background measures that set
266  See Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 1015 (1979); Wax, supra note __;  cf. Posner, Family Law,
supra note __, at 270 (“marriage law offers a basket of immutable obligations and forbids almost any
deviation”).
267  See Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note __ (conforming to expectations of marital role,
even without legal marriage, might result in a legally-recognized union).
Upon divorce, courts continue to view many assets acquired during the marriage, such as
degrees or professional goodwill, as owned by the individual spouse (typically the husband) who has 
“earned” it, rather than ascribing it to the marital community and the efforts of the non-owning spouse
(typically the wife).  See Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets:
The Ascendancy of Self over the marital Community, 81 B,U.L. REV. 59 (2001).  
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limits.266  While roles within marriage are changing, women still perform the caretaking and housework,
mothers still earn less than men and are more likely to make career and job sacrifices for the marital
community.  Divorce law fails to reflect these diverse realities, reinforcing only egalitarian gender roles
without recognizing the divergence between the law and the social norms for marital behaviour.267  
The stories told pursuant to a fault-based divorce regime illustrate the intertwined nature of legal and
social norms, and the dangers – and potentialities – of divergence.  
